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REINTERPRETING THE 
REINTERPRETATION: COLLECTIVE 
SELF-DEFENSE AS CONSTITUTIONAL 
FIDELITY 
C. D. A. Evans1& Aviel Menter2 
ABSTRACT 
As currently interpreted, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution requires Japan’s Self-Defense 
Forces (JSDF) to operate in a purely defensive capacity. Recently, however, the United States 
has increasingly asked Japan to participate in joint military operations, in which Japanese forces 
would defend not only themselves, but also their American allies. This raises an important legal 
question: does Article 9 permit the JSDF engage in this kind of collective self-defense? 
Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo believed so. After a government panel of legal experts 
found that collective self-defense was consistent with Article 9, the Abe administration adopted 
the panel’s conclusion. However, this “Reinterpretation” of Article 9 has been highly 
controversial. Japanese scholars of constitutional law are deeply divided on the meaning of 
Article 9 and the legality of the Reinterpretation. While some maintain that Article 9 prohibits 
collective self-defense, others have argued that Article 9 either permits it, or is superseded by 
Japan’s treaty obligations to the United States. 
However, until now, these arguments have not been reflected in the non-Japanese literature. 
Accordingly, English-language scholarship has often assumed with little discussion that the 
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Reinterpretation is inconsistent with Article 9, before proceeding to analyze the Reinterpretation 
as a failed attempt to informally amend the Article 9 without the requisite democratic support. 
This essay re-frames the debate. The Reinterpretation is not an attempt to amend Article 9, but 
an attempt to understand it. Accordingly, its legitimacy is not derived from the magnitude of its 
popular support, but the strength of its legal justifications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After unconditional surrender in World War II, Japan was 
occupied by a foreign power for the first time in her recorded 
history.3 As a condition of the Instrument of Unconditional 
Surrender, Japan disarmed its military and adopted an amended 
Constitution that, in its ninth article, prohibited the maintenance of 
“land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential.”4 
Despite this commitment, Japan has long maintained armed 
forces.5 In 1950, while Japan was still under American occupation, 
Army General Headquarters (GHQ) instructed leaders of the 
fledgling Japanese Diet to create a National Police Reserve (NPR) of 
75,000 persons, so that the United States could redeploy her own 
ground forces to fight in the Korean War.6 Over time, the NPR 
evolved into Japan’s current armed forces, the JSDF (Japan Self-
Defense Forces).7 Although the occupation of Japan ended in 1952, 
Japanese legal commitments made during the occupation were 
incorporated into the Treaty of San Francisco, the instrument 
through which Japan regained full sovereignty.8 Subsequently, 
 
 3 See generally MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN (2002). 
 4 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], art. 9, para. 2, translated in The Constitution 
of Japan, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET, http://japan.kantei.go.jp
/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2020). 
 5 See Takei Tomohisa, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the New Maritime 
Era, 34 HATOU 4 (2008) (“Japan’s naval build up began after the Meiji Restoration 
in 1868 . . . [F]leet battle doctrine . . . continued until the dismantlement of Imperial 
Navy in 1945 . . . At the onset of the Cold War, once the East-West 
confrontational posture had been clearly delineated, the JMSDF formally emerged 
from its predecessor of two years, the Coastal Safety Force or Kaijo Keibitai.”) 
 6 MASUDA HIROSHI, MACARTHUR IN ASIA: THE GENERAL AND HIS STAFF 
IN THE PHILIPPINES, JAPAN, AND KOREA 253 (2012). 
 7 See Ayako Kusunoki, The Early Years of the Ground Self-Defense Forces, 1945–
1960 in THE JAPANESE GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCE: SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY 
8 (Eldrige & Midford, eds. (2017) (providing a chronology of the SDF); id. at 60–62 
(describing the evolution of the SDF from the NPR). 
 8 Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister of Japan, Speech on Signing Treaty of 
San Francisco (Sept. 7, 1951); see also STEVEN GOW CALABRESI ET AL., THE U. S. 
CONSTITUTION AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TEXTS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS (forthcoming 2021). 
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military cooperation has remained a core element of Japanese defense 
policy.9 Recent developments, including the rise of military 
assertiveness in China and North Korea, have placed more emphasis 
on joint Japanese-American military operations.10 On December 
26th, 2019, Japan even agreed, for the first time, to dispatch 
independent naval forces to the Middle East.11 These new 
deployments raise key questions about the legal status of the JSDF.12 
Should Japanese force deployments be treated as military 
expeditions? If so, do they violate Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution?13 
Japanese judges and constitutional scholars have long 
struggled to reconcile the Post-War Constitution’s prima facie 
commitment to disarmament with the continued maintenance of 
armed forces.14 Some scholars have argued that the prohibition in 
paragraph 2 of Article 9 is less all-encompassing than it appears, 
limited by the Article’s preamble to the use of military force “as a 
means of settling international disputes.”15 Others have argued that 
the Treaty of San Francisco overrides the limitations of the Post-War 
Constitution, requiring the continued maintenance of military forces, 
as well as continued military cooperation with the United States.16 
 
 9 Nobukatsu Kanehara, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Office of the 
Prime Minister of Japan, Speech on Japan’s Grand Strategy and Universal Values at 
Columbia University (Apr. 11, 2017). 
 10 Shinsuke J. Sugiyama, Ambassador of Japan to the United States, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Speech on Japan’s Strategy for the 21st 
Century at Columbia University (Nov. 16, 2018). 
 11 Kiyoshi Takenaka, Japan to Send Warship, Aircraft to Middle East to Protect 
Vessels, REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2019, 7:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
mideast-iran-japan/japan-to-send-warship-aircraft-to-middle-east-to-protect-
vessels-idUSKBN1YV00W. 
 12 Interview in person with Mizobuchi Masashi, Minister-Counsellor at the 
Embassy of Japan, D.C. (Jan. 17, 2021). 
 13 Id. 
 14 See, e.g., Itazuke Air Force Base Dispute (Japan v. Matsumoto et. al.), Tokyo 
High Court 9–11 (Mar. 5, 1960) (translation on file with author). 
 15 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ], art. 9, para. 1 (Japan). 
 16 See Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 19, Sept. 8, 1951, 3. U.S.T. 3169, 136 
U.N.T.S. 45. 
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Japan’s Supreme Court addressed this problem to some 
extent in the 1950s, holding in Sakata v. Japan17 that Article 9 permits 
the maintenance of self-defense forces, at least so long as those 
forces lack the strength to wage a war of aggression. Yet recent 
developments have created renewed tension between the 
requirements of Article 9 and Japan’s self-defense needs.18 As the 
United States increasingly requests Japanese participation in joint 
military activities,19 the JSDF has been ordered to conduct operations 
that do not fall cleanly into a narrow definition of self-defense. These 
developments test the limits of the Court’s holding in Sakata, and 
accordingly the limits of Article 9 as well. 
To resolve this tension, the Japanese government under 
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo made a series of administrative and 
legislative moves intended to clarify the scope of permissible military 
activity, as well as the status of Japan’s military forces. Originally, the 
Abe administration proposed a constitutional amendment to Article 
9.20 However, after the proposed amendments failed to generate a 
broad parliamentary majority, the administration, working through 
the Cabinet, commissioned and then adopted by resolution and 
legislation a “reinterpretation” of Article 9, interpreting it to permit 
Japanese forces to engage in collective self-defense.21 
 
 17 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959). 
 18 Steve Herman, Japan Mulls Constitutional Reform, VOICE OF AMERICA 
(Feb. 15, 2006, 9:27 AM), https://www.voanews.com/archive/japan-mulls-
constitutional-reform. 
 19 Trump Expects Japan’s Military to Reinforce United States in Asia and Beyond, 
REUTERS (May 27, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-
usa/trump-expects-japans-military-to-reinforce-united-states-in-asia-and-beyond-
idUSKCN1SY06Y. 
 20 See generally NIHON-KOKU KENPOU KAISEI SOUAN, POLICY PLATFORM 
OF THE LDP (2012), available at http://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/
seisaku-109.pdf (Japanese language). 
 21 THE ADVISORY PANEL ON CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL BASIS FOR 
SECURITY, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
LEGAL BASIS FOR SECURITY (2014), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/
anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ADVISORY 
PANEL]. 
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This Reinterpretation quickly set off a heated legal debate in 
Japan.22 Although many Japanese contend that Article 9 prohibits 
Japanese forces from engaging in collective self-defense,23 others 
have read the Article differently,24 or argued that Japan’s international 
obligations supersede this domestic constitutional requirement.25 
Outside of Japan, however, this legal debate has received 
relatively little attention. International constitutional analysis of the 
Reinterpretation has often assumed that the Abe administration’s 
understanding of Article 9 is legally unfounded.26 Instead, it has 
treated the Reinterpretation as an attempt to amend the Japanese 
constitution without going through the formal amendment process.27 
This scholarship has generally applied Professor Bruce Ackerman’s 
five-step model28 for informal constitutional change. This model 
views constitutional change as arising out of a groundswell of 
national popular support, rather than a formal legal process. 
Accordingly, scholars applying Ackerman’s model have usually 
concluded that the Reinterpretation lacks the requisite popular 
approval to legitimize any attempt at informal constitutional 
amendment.29 
 
 22 Justin McCurry, Japanese Pacifists Unnerved by Lifting of Ban on Military 
Intervention, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014, 9:01 AM) (quoting Takeshi Ishida, 
Professor Emeritus at Tokyo University). 
 23 See, e.g., James E. Auer, Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution: From Renunciation 
of Armed Force ‘Forever’ to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World, 53 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 183 (1990). 
 24 See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21. 
 25 Narushige Michishita, Vice-President, Nat’l Graduate Inst. for Pol’y 
Studies, Lecture at the Bos. Univ. Ctr. for the Study of Asia: The Rise of China and 
Japan’s Response (Sept. 25, 2019). 
 26 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Guy Baldwin, Globalizing Constitutional 
Moments? A Reflection on the Japanese Article 9 Debate, 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 145, 159–61 
(2019). 
 27 See, e.g., Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional Amendment 
and the “Reinterpretation” of Japan’s War Powers, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 427, 508–11 
(2017). 
 28 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
 29 See, e.g., Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 163–72; Martin, supra note 
27, at 502–06. 
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This Essay, however, argues that the Reinterpretation should 
not be understood as an informal constitutional amendment, because 
it isn’t trying to amend the Constitution in the first instance. 
International analysis of the Reinterpretation often takes as a premise 
the primary issue in dispute: whether the Reinterpretation is based on 
a legally justifiable understanding of the Post-War Constitution. If it 
is, as many Japanese scholars contend,30 then the Reinterpretation is 
not an attempted circumvention of the Constitution’s amendment 
process. It is instead an honest effort to resolve a genuine legal 
problem—specifically, the apparent contradiction between Article 9’s 
prohibition on military activity and Japan’s treaty obligation to 
maintain defense forces. Like any other interpretation of a 
constitutional provision, the Reinterpretation should therefore be 
judged according to its legal merits, not its popularity. 
Part I of this Essay explains the historical developments that 
led to Japan’s current legal predicament. It discusses Japan’s initial 
adoption of Article 9 as part of the post-war Constitution, followed 
by the creation of defense forces pursuant to GHQ’s guidance after 
the outbreak of the Korean War. Part I then recounts some of 
Japan’s earlier failed attempts to amend Article 9 prior to the 
Reinterpretation, demonstrating that the uncertain constitutional 
status of the JSDF has posed legal problems since long before the 
Abe administration. 
Part II of this Essay lays out the legal basis for the 
Reinterpretation, discussing the differing legal stances that scholars 
have taken with respect to Article 9 and the Treaty of San Francisco. 
Although the Reinterpretation is inconsistent with some of these 
legal understandings, it is potentially compatible with others. In 
particular, the Reinterpretation can be justified by a reading of Article 
 
 30 See, for example, extended discussions of varying views offered in 
NAKAJIMA TORU, CASEBOOK ON JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010) 
(Japanese language). Japanese scholars generally adopt a positivist approach to 
Constitutional reconstruction, as the Japanese legal tradition is somewhat removed 
from natural law influences more common in the European tradition. Cf. C. D. A. 
Evans, Suarez: Law and Obligation, PHIL. F. (Sept. 2, 2011). But even from a natural 
law perspective, all that is needed for our argument is that the issue is complex and 
the answer genuinely a subject of dispute. 
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9 that permits collective self-defense, or by an understanding that 
treats Japan’s obligations under the Treaty of San Francisco as 
supreme over domestic Japanese law, including Japanese 
constitutional law. 
Finally, Part III of this Essay responds to international 
constitutional scholarship analyzing the Reinterpretation as an 
attempt to informally amend the Japanese Constitution. It argues that 
the requirements of Article 9 have not been sufficiently established, 
either as a matter of original meaning or by any authoritative body, 
for the Reinterpretation to “amend” the Article. Instead, the 
Reinterpretation is better understood as a genuine legal position on 
the meaning of the Constitution, motivated by a desire to reconcile 
Japan’s domestic and international obligations. 
Constitutions cannot be written with the “prolixity of a legal 
code.”31 Their terms are often broad, subject to future exposition and 
clarification.32 It can be tempting to accuse constitutional actors of 
politically motivated revisionism when disagreement arises over the 
interpretation of a constitutional provision. But unless these actors 
are openly or demonstrably operating in bad faith, such accusations 
diminish the scope of liberal discourse. Multiple interpretations of a 
constitutional provision are often reasonable—and if one 
interpretation is correct, then it is correct regardless of its political 
implications. 
I. THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN 
Following the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the United 
States led an occupying force that took political control over Japan in 
1945.33 General Headquarters (GHQ) set up shop in Tokyo,34 with a 
mandate to prevent Japan from returning to the fascist politics that 
 
 31 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 32 This is certainly true of Japan’s Constitution. See J. Mark Ramseyer, 17 J. 
JAPANESE STUD. 176, 176–78 (1991) (reviewing HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE 
SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES (1990)). 
 33 See JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF 
WORLD WAR II 39–80 (1999). 
 34 Id. at 45–48. 
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had caused immense global suffering from 1931 to 1945.35 An 
integral part of this effort was GHQ’s planned revision of the Meiji 
Constitution.36 
Section 10 of the Potsdam Declaration required Japan to 
effect political change establishing democracy and protecting civil 
liberties. Section 12 stated that occupation would continue until the 
changes outlined in the Declaration were completed to allied 
satisfaction. GHQ made clear early on that amending the 
Constitution was necessary to satisfy Section 12. 
At first, Japan was reluctant to entirely replace the Meiji 
Constitution. Matsumoto Joji (松本烝治), Japan’s Minister for 
Constitutional Reform, led a committee of constitutional law experts 
that recommended only modest changes in February of 1946.37 
Supreme Allied Commander General Douglas MacArthur rejected 
this draft out of hand, instead directing GHQ to draft an entirely new 
Constitution.38 The authors of this new document—principally Army 
lawyers Milo Rowell39 and Courtney Whitney40—attempted to take 
into consideration historical influences on Japanese law, as well as 
 
 35 See, e.g., MARK FELTON, SLAUGHTER AT SEA: THE STORY OF JAPAN’S 
NAVAL WAR CRIMES (2007); HARRIES, MEIRION HARRIES, SUSIE HARRIES, 
SOLDIERS OF THE SUN: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY 
(1994); SHELDON HARRIS, FACTORIES OF DEATH: JAPANESE BIOLOGICAL 
WARFARE 1932–945 (2010); BRIAN MACARTHUR, GUESTS OF THE EMPEROR: THE 
SECRET HISTORY OF JAPAN’S MUKDEN POW CAMP (2005). 
 36 The Meiji Constitution, formally the Constitution of the Empire of 
Japan, came into effect November 29, 1890. It was Japan’s first modern 
Constitution. The main prior constitutional text was the ancient Seventeen-Article 
Constitution, first recorded in the 8th Century. For further information, see 
generally Calabresi, supra note 8. For background on the political ideas behind the 
Meiji Restoration and the subsequent constitution, see C. D. A. Evans & Ishikawa 
Hanako, A New Translation of Yoshida Shoin’s Taisaku Ichido, 8 J. JAPANESE PHIL. 
(forthcoming 2021). 
 37 JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF 
WORLD WAR II 351–54 (1999). 
 38 Id. at 360. 
 39 Id. at 364. 
 40 Id. at 373. 
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guidance from Japanese legal scholars.41 The Army’s draft was 
presented to Japanese officials on February 13th, 1946. An outline 
was released on March 6th, 1946. To preserve legal continuity, the 
new Constitution was formally adopted as an amendment to the Meiji 
Constitution, in accordance with Article 73.42 The new Constitution 
was approved on October 6th, 1946.43 It became law on November 
3rd, 1946 and came into effect on May 3rd, 1947.44 
The Post-War Constitution is approximately 5,000 words 
long, containing a preamble and 103 articles.45 The new Constitution 
immediately gave rise to a number of interpretative controversies, but 
it has never been amended.46 Some of the controversy over the 
Constitution arises because it was adopted on the instruction of an 
occupying power. This has led to a debate between the “external 
imposition” theory and the “internal consistency” theory.47 
The external imposition theory emphasizes that the 
Constitution was imposed involuntarily on Japan by the occupying 
Allied Powers.48 A famous meeting on February 13th, 1946 provides 
evidence to support this narrative. On that day, General Whitney met 
with then Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru (吉田 茂) to discuss 
constitutional reform.49 Rather than making modifications to Minister 
Matsumoto’s prior draft, Whitney handed out the draft written by 
GHQ.50 All sides were aware that GHQ was considering prosecuting 
 
 41 Id. at 364–74; see also J. Mark Ramseyer, Together Duped: How Japanese and 
Americans Negotiated a Constitution without Communicating, 23 L. JAPAN 123, 123-126 
(1990) (reviewing KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A 
LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING (1991)). 
 42 Id. at 383–91. 
 43 Id. at 394–404. 
 44 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (JAPAN). 
 45 See generally id. 
 46 MATSUI SHIGENORI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS ch. 9, part I (2011). 
 47 Id. 
 48 See, e.g., Robert E. Ward, The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 980 (1956). 
 49 DOWER, supra note 37, at 364. 
 50 Id. at 365. 
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the Emperor, which Matsumoto sought to avoid at all costs.51 In that 
context, Whitney’s demand that Japan adopt GHQ’s draft seemed 
like a threat.52 On this recounting of events, the Constitution was 
thrust upon the Japanese people by the United States.53 Naturally, if 
the Constitution was imposed by external forces, an independent 
Japan might seek to amend or replace it. Indeed, some conservatives 
have deployed this argument since ratification,54 with a particular 
focus on Article 9.55 
The “internal consistency” account, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the degree to which GHQ’s draft was shaped by 
Whitney’s sense of Japanese history and comments from Japanese 
scholars. This theory stresses that GHQ’s draft was substantively 
amended by Japanese parliamentarians, and notes that the language 
of the Post-War Constitution has been subsequently interpreted to 
reflect Japan’s values.56 The internal consistency theory also 
highlights the continuing public approval for the modern 
Constitution, expressed in part by a lack of amendments.57 
Proponents of the internal consistency account are more cautious 
about amending the Constitution. Similarly, they tend to focus less on 
amending Article 9. 
 
 51 Id. at 352, 366. 
 52 Id. at 376–77. 
 53 For a description of this meeting from the Japanese side, see generally 
SATO TATSUO, NIHONKOKU KENPO SEIRITSUSHI (1964) at Vol. 3, 47–57 [Japanese 
language]. From the American side, see NIHONKOKU KEMPŌ SEITEI NO KATEI 
(Takayanag et al. eds. 1987) at Vol. 1, 320–36 [Japanese language]. 
 54 See e.g. ETO JUN, 1946 NEN KENPO: SONO KOSOKU (THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 1946: ITS CONSTRAINT) (1980) [Japanese language]. 
 55 See e.g. ETO JUN, TOZASARETA GENGO KUKAN: SENRYOGUN NO 
KENNETSU TO SENGO NIHON (THE SEALED LINGUISTIC SPACE: THE 
CENSORSHIP OF THE OCCUPATION FORCES AND POSTWAR JAPAN) (1994) 
[Japanese language]. 
 56 See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, Book Review, 41 J. ASIAN STUD. 142 (1981) 
(reviewing JAPAN’S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT 
(JOHN M. MAKI ed. & trans., 1981)). 
 57 Of course, the lack of amendments isn’t entirely due to overwhelming 
approval—the Japanese Constitution is difficult to amend. See NIHONKOKU 
KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan). 
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A. Article 9 
GHQ’s primary goal in drafting the new Constitution was to 
prevent Japan from threatening East Asia after the Occupation 
concluded. To that end, the Constitution includes extensive 
restrictions on Japan’s future use of military force. The most 
important restrictions are codified in Article 9.58 The full text of 
Article 9 reads: 
ARTICLE 9. 
(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based 
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes. 
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.59 
Paragraph (1) renounces war as a sovereign right. This could 
be interpreted to mean as little as renouncing the right to formally 
declare war, while maintaining the right to self-defense (sometimes 
 
 58 See 13 Keishū 13, 3225, 3232, Sup. Ct. Grand Bench, Dec. 16, 1959, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=13. For analysis of this case, 
see also Miyoko Tsujimura, Kenpō [Constitution] 59 (2000). (Additional 
restrictions on the use of armed force might be sourced to the Constitution’s 
Preamble, which clearly states the document’s pacifist aims. But Japan’s Supreme 
Court has held that this language is too vague to meaningfully restrict military 
force, instead holding that the commitments in the Preamble are realized through 
specific provisions in the subsequent text.). 
 59 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan). (In the 
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considered an inalienable sovereign right).60 Or it could mean as 
much as requiring the complete renunciation of any belligerent 
activity whatsoever. 
Paragraph (2) begins with a statement of purpose, which may 
or may not constrain the remaining text. It then forbids “land, sea 
and air forces”—whatever that means. Finally, it renounces the “right 
of belligerency”—whatever that means. 
1. Article 9, Paragraph 1 
Most constitutional law scholars in Japan interpret Paragraph 
1 of Article 9 to forbid the invasion of another country using force or 
the threat of force.61 
The Japanese text is clearer here. In English, it is logically 
possible that Article 9’s setting aside of “war as a sovereign right of 
the nation” applies only “to the threat or use of force as a means of 
settling international disputes.” In Japanese, it is clearer that the 
“renunciation of war” is more general.62 
What is meant by “war . . . as a means of settling international 
disputes?” Context from other treaties during this period helps 
clarify. For example, the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of 
War uses the phrase “war for the solution of international 
controversies.”63 In that Treaty, the term meant invasion of other 
countries.64 Because of the similarity in language, the majority of 
 
 60 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 61 See NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌGAKU I [CONSTITUTION STUDY] 529 
(1992); see also Tsujimura, supra note 58, at 107–11. 
 62 See generally Ward, supra note 48. 
 63 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 46 Stat. 2343 (1928). 
 64 See Further Correspondence with Government of the United States Respecting the 
United States Proposal for the Renunciation of War (June 23, 1928); B. J. C. MCKERCHER, 
THE SECOND BALDWIN GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES, 1924-1929, at 
246 (1984). 
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scholars interpret Paragraph 1 to renounce only wars of invasion, not 
self-defense.65 
While this is the majority view, some scholars disagree, 
arguing that Paragraph 1 truly renounces all wars (including wars of 
self-defense)66—perhaps because it is too difficult to distinguish a 
war of invasion from a war of self-defense.67 
2. Article 9, Paragraph 2 
There are two major interpretations of Paragraph 2. The first 
is that Paragraph 2 permits war for self-defense. The key, on this 
account, is the prefatory clause:68 “ . . . in order to accomplish the aim 
of the preceding paragraph.” Because the aim of Paragraph 1 is to 
renounce war “as a means of settling international disputes,” and the 
phrase “as a means of settling international disputes” means, in 
context, an invasion directed at foreign countries, the restriction on 
maintaining armed forces applies only to the aim of not invading 
foreign countries. Therefore, war in self-defense is permitted.69 For 
clarity, we call this first interpretation the “self-defense 
interpretation.” 
The second major interpretation does not read the prefatory 
clause as limiting the scope of the operative clause. Under this 
interpretation, Paragraph 2 fully renounces self-defense.70 In the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, particularly prior to 
 
 65 See NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, supra note 61, at 257; KOKUSAI Hō 
[INTERNATIONAL LAW] 310 (Kisaburo Yokota ed. 1966).) 
 66 See, e.g., MIYAZAWA TOSHIYOSHI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] (1962). 
 67 See, e.g., TSUJIMURA, supra note 58, at 108 . 
 68 The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution has a similar 
structure, containing both a prefatory clause (“A well-regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State”) and an operative clause (“the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has rejected a reading of the prefatory 
clause that would limit the Amendment’s operative clause. District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 578 (2008) (“But apart from that clarifying function, a 
prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.”). 
 69 Ward, supra note 48. 
 70 NOBUYOSHI, supra note 61, at 259–61. 
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the creation of the National Police Reserve (NPR) (警察予備隊), the 
government operated under this interpretation.71 Japan’s defense 
strategy consequently relied on diplomatic alliances.72 Around half of 
constitutional law scholars in Japan now hold this perspective.73 For 
clarity, we call this interpretation the “pacifist interpretation.” 
One strong argument in favor of the self-defense 
interpretation is that Article 66, Paragraph 2 requires the Prime 
Minister and other Ministers of State to be civilians. This restriction 
would not make sense if military forces were forbidden, because if 
that were the case, all Ministers would be civilians regardless.74 The 
Abe Administration has generally adopted the self-defense 
interpretation, in part because of this argument.75 Of course, the Abe 
Administration’s interpretation still forbids invasion or other 
aggressive military actions.76 
3. Constitutional Supremacy 
Under the terms of Japan’s surrender in 1945, Japan accepted 
fundamental limitations on her sovereignty. For the first time in 
Japan’s history, Japan placed a foreign power legally above her own 
government, subject to the constraints of the terms of surrender77 
and background international legal rules governing occupations.78 
General MacArthur represented the highest authority in Japan from 
the beginning of the unconditional surrender until the Treaty of San 
 
 71 See, e.g., Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister, plenary session, House of 
Representative, June 26, 1946 in Shimizu, Shingiroku 2: 82–83 [Japanese language]. 
 72 See NOBUYOSHI, supra note 61, at 266. 
 73 See id. at 260 (surveying the field). 
 74 Id. at 258–61. 
 75 Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, Senior Adviser, Cabinet of 
Japan, Tokyo, Japan (Jul. 11, 2019). 
 76 For the origin of this view, still in force, see Answer of Ichiro Yoshikuni 
before the Budget Committee of the House of Councilors, Nov. 13, 1972, Sangiin 
yosan iin kaigiroku [Budget Committee of House of Councilors Minutes], 70th Diet 
Session, No. 5, at 2 (Nov. 13, 1972). 
 77 See generally ROBERT J. C. BUTOW, JAPAN’S DECISION TO SURRENDER 
(1954). 
 78 Wladyslaw Czaplinski, Jus Cogens and the Law of Treaties, in THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 84-88 (2006). 
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Francisco took effect in 1952, ending the occupation.79 But just how 
high does that highest authority go? Suppose that GHQ issued a 
command that conflicted with the Constitution. Which would be 
supreme? 
This is a vexing question. On the one hand, we are used to 
thinking of constitutions as the supreme law of the land.80 On the 
other hand, under the specific circumstances of an unconditional 
surrender, there is a strong legal argument that GHQ had not just de 
facto supremacy but also legal supremacy, at least during the 
occupation. Certainly, GHQ acted that way in redrafting the Japanese 
Constitution.81 This question is particularly relevant to the JSDF 
because the JSDF’s predecessor force was created by order of GHQ. 
a. History of the National Police Reserve / JSDF 
During the occupation, it was initially GHQ policy to disarm 
and demilitarize Japan.82 However, as strategic circumstances 
changed, American policy evolved. Early on, diplomat John Foster 
Dulles83 urged General MacArthur to support limited remilitarization. 
MacArthur demurred,84 but, after the outbreak of the Korean War, 
was forced to redirect American troops to the Korean Peninsula.85 
This left Japan under-garrisoned. With Japan’s economy rapidly 
recovering, MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida on 
July 8th, 1950, ordering the creation of the National Police Reserve 
(NPR).86 
 
 79 DOWER, supra note 37, at 80–87. 
 80 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 81 See SATO, supra note 53. 
 82 See Kuzuhara Kazumi, The Korean War and the National Police Reserve of 
Japan, 7 NIDS SECURITY REP. 95, 95 (2006). 
 83 Dulles served as Chief Negotiator for the Treaty of San Francisco and 
later served as Secretary of State to President Eisenhower. See RICHARD H. 
IMMERMAN, JOHN FOSTER DULLES: PIETY, PRAGMATISM AND POWER IN U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY xvii-xxvi (1988). 
 84 See Alan Millett, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Korean War: Cautionary Tale 
and Hopeful Precedent, 10 J. AM.-E. ASIAN REL. 155, 174 (2001). 
 85 Hiroshi, supra note 6, at 254. 
 86 Id. at 253. 
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The NPR was duly created by Government Ordinance No. 
260 (G.O.260) on August 10, 1950.87 G.O.260 immediately raised 
legal questions as it seemed, prima facie, to conflict with Article 9, 
Paragraph 2 of the new Constitution. 
Specifically, two questions arose: (1) does G.O.260 conflict 
with A9P2? (2) if so, which authority trumps? 
b. Supreme Court Precedent: Sakata v. Japan 
The Supreme Court considered the fundamental question of 
the constitutionality of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) (自衛
隊)—the NPR’s successor—in Sakata v. Japan. In 1955, angered by 
plans to evict local residents in order to expand a nearby American 
military base, protesters stormed the base’s airfield, in violation of 
posted restrictions.88 The protestors were tried and convicted, but 
appealed, arguing that Article 9 forbade any military presence in 
Japan, invalidating their convictions.89 
The Supreme Court concluded that Article 9 did not forbid 
the JSDF.90 While acknowledging the pacifist intentions of the 
framers of Paragraph 2,91 the Court held that nothing in the Article 
prevented Japan from exercising her sovereign right of self-defense.92 
 
 87 Id. at 254. 
 88 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225, 3225-27 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959). 
 89 Id. at 98-99. 
 90 Id. (“[I]t cannot be acknowledged that the stationing of the United States 
armed forces is immediately, clearly unconstitutional and void, contravening the 
purport of Article 9. . . . [O]n the contrary, it must be held that it is in accord with 
the intent and purpose of these constitutional provisions.”). 
 91 Id. (“We, the people of Japan, do not maintain the so-called war potential 
provided in paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Constitution, but we have determined to 
supplement the shortcomings in our national defense resulting therefrom by 
trusting in the justice and faith of the peace loving people of the world, and thereby 
preserve our peace and existence.”). 
 92 Id. (“[C]ertainly there is nothing in [Article 9] which would deny the right 
of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power. The pacifism 
advocated in our Constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or 
nonresistance”.). 
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The Supreme Court concluded that self-defense is an inalienable right 
of all sovereign states and cannot be waived.93 
A natural law approach might understand the right to self-
defense as a fundamental property of sovereignty;94 but the Japanese 
Supreme Court did not take this approach.95 Instead, the Court 
grounded the inherent right of self-defense in general concepts of 
international law.96 The Court considered three main ways the right 
of self-defense might be waived.97 First, by international law, if Japan 
were to sign a broad global treaty foregoing the right of self-
defense.98 Second, by transnational law, if Japan were to sign a treaty 
with specific countries so forbidding the right.99 Third, by domestic 
supremacy, on the assumption that the Constitution has supremacy 
over international commitments. In Japan’s case, arguably, all three 
conditions apply. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed by Japan at 
the close of the occupation, seems to imply that Japan will forego 
self-defense.100 Similarly, the U. S.—Japan Security Treaty of 1952 (
日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約
) assumes a minimal role for Japan.101 Third, Article 9 itself arguably 
alienates Japan’s right to self-defense.102 
 
 93 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959) (quoting 
supplemental opinion of Justice Kotaro Tanaka: “[t]he fact that a state possesses 
the right of self-defense for the sake of preserving its national existence is 
universally recognized”). 
 94 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
 95 Japan’s Supreme Court has steadfastly maintained a positivist approach 
to law common to East Asian jurisdictions that inherited the German approach to 
legal interpretation. For further analysis, see generally Bernd Martin & Peter Wetzler, 
The German Role in the Modernization of Japan—The Pitfall of Blind Acculturation, 33 
ORIENS EXTREMUS 77 (1990). 
 96 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 19, Sept. 8, 1951, 3. U.S.T. 3169, 136 
U.N.T.S. 45. 
 101 Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, Japan-U.S., art. I, 
Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329 (“Japan grants, and the United States of America 
accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this 
Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such 
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However, the Court did not think that any of these events 
indicated an intention to forego self-defense.103 Instead, the Court 
held that these provisions barred only offensive or aggressive military 
conduct.104 
Because Article 9 did not preclude self-defense, the Court 
gave great deference to the Parliament and the Prime Minister in 
matters of defense policy.105 Entering a security alliance is a political 
decision, the Court held, properly the province of the democratically 
selected branches of the state.106 Therefore, the Court held that the 
 
forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from 
without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese 
Government to put down largescale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused 
through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers . . . “). 
 102 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (Japan). 
 103 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959) (“ . . . we 
are free to choose whatever method or means deemed appropriate to accomplish 
our objectives in the light of the actual international situation, as long as such 
measures are for the purpose of preserving the peace and security of our country”). 
 104 Id. (“This Article renounces . . . war and prohibits the maintenance of 
. . . war potential, but certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the right of 
self-defense. . . . [T]he pacifism advocated in our Constitution was never intended 
to mean defenselessness.”) 
 105 Id. (“The Security Treaty, therefore . . . is featured with an extremely 
high degree of political consideration, having bearing upon the very existence of 
our country as a sovereign power”). This deference is echoed in other cases. See, 
e.g., Itazuke, supra note 14. 
 106 Id. (“Accordingly, unless the said treaty is obviously unconstitutional 
and void, it falls outside the purview of the power of judicial review granted to the 
court . . . [the wisdom of the Treaty] should be left primarily to the Cabinet which 
has the power to conclude treaties and [the Parliament] which has the power to 
ratify them.”) 
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U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was constitutional107— any recourse for 
the protestors would have to come from the ballot box.108 
At the time of Sakata, the JSDF was capable only of 
defensive action. The constitutionality of a more expanded force 
remains an open question.109 
c. Incorporation by Treaty 
Japan regained full sovereignty with the Treaty of San 
Francisco (サンフランシスコ講和条約), signed by 49 nations on 
September 8th, 1951.110 The Treaty took effect on April 28, 1952, 
officially ending the Allied Occupation of Japan.111 The US-Japan 
Security Treaty was signed the same day, as part of the same 
process.112 One might think that, having resumed full sovereignty, 
Japan was no longer under any obligation to obey an order from the 
United States. But this is not entirely the case. Although Article 1 of 
the Treaty of San Francisco restores sovereignty to Japan, many of 
the Treaty’s articles explicitly reaffirm and incorporate decisions 
made by the occupying Allied Powers.113 Other parts of the Treaty 
reaffirm certain interpretations of Article 9, explicitly permitting 
collective self-defense.114 
 
 107 Id. (“It cannot be acknowledged that the stationing of the United States 
armed forces is immediately, clearly unconstitutional and void, contravening the 
purport of Article 9, paragraph 2 of Article 98, and the Preamble of the 
Constitution. On the contrary, it must be held that it is in accord with the intent 
and purpose of these constitutional provisions.”). 
 108 Id. (“[t]he wisdom of the Treaty] should be left . . . ultimately to the 
political consideration of the people with whom rests the sovereign power of the 
nation”). 
 109 See generally Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 
1959). 
 110 Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, supra note 101. 
 113 For example, Article 4(b) affirms decisions regarding the disposition of 
property located in overseas territory. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16. 
 114 For example, Article 5(iii)(c) retains the right to individual and collective 
self-defense. Id. 
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Clarifying the legality of orders issued during the occupation, 
Article 8 recognizes as binding law “the full force of all treaties now 
or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers.”115 In addition, Article 
19(d) reads: 
(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and 
omissions done during the period of occupation 
under or in consequence of directives of the 
occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law 
at that time. 
Article 19(d) applies to orders issued by the Supreme Allied 
Commander, including his letter on July 8, 1950 creating the NPR.116 
The JSDF evolved out of the NPR and General Order 260. G.O.260 
(and its successor enabling acts) are incorporated by treaty into the 
Post-War Japanese legal and political system. The Treaty of San 
Francisco, including Article 19(d), remains in force to this day.117 
Despite this, of course, Japan’s (unamended) 1946 Constitution 
remains the law of the land. 
In the United States, we are used to thinking of the 
Constitution as the highest law—a supreme document that 
encompasses, as Hart puts it, our Rules of Recognition, Arbitration 
and Change.118 In Japan, the situation is murkier. The Constitution 
clearly has priority over ordinary legislation.119 It also (probably) has 
priority over international treaties.120 But the Treaty of San Francisco 
 
 115 Id. at art. 8. 
 116 Prime Minister Yoshida’s speech at the signing and his personal 
reflections make it abundantly clear that continuing legal force was intended. See 
generally Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16; Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister 
of Japan, Speech on Signing Treaty of San Francisco (Sept. 7, 1951); Yoshida 
Shigeru, supra note 71. 
 117 See Articles 4(b), 5(iii)(c), 6(a) and 8 all reference continuing legal 
authority of actions taken during the occupation. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ 
[KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 4(b), 5(iii), 6(a), 8 (Japan) (formally incorporating as 
legal various actions taken during the occupation). 
 118 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
 119 Satoh Junichi, Judicial Review in Japan, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603, 606–07 
(2008). 
 120 Id. at 623–24. 
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is more complicated. The Constitution of Japan reifies the will of the 
Japanese people.121 But Japan only has the sovereign authority to reify 
its peoples will because of its acceptance of the terms of 
unconditional surrender. In this sense, then, Japan’s contract to 
uphold the terms of the Treaty of San Francisco could represent a 
higher legal authority even than the Constitution, for the latter could 
not exist without the former.122 
Consequently, even if the JSDF possessed offensive capacity 
that could potentially violate Article 9, Paragraph 2 under the 
reasoning in Sakata, that capacity might still be legally permissible, 
because where Article 9, Paragraph 2 conflicts with the orders of 
GHQ (incorporated by the Treaty of San Francisco), arguably, the 
Treaty has priority. We tackle this thorny and complex issue at length 
in Part II. 
B. Attempts to Amend the Constitution: A History of Controversy 
Since 1952, several proposals to revise the Constitution have 
been advanced.123 The Constitution requires that Amendments be 
approved first by a two-thirds supermajority in the Diet (Japan’s 
Parliament), and then submitted to a popular referendum.124 No 
amendment has ever made it past the Diet. 
1. Background, History of Constitutional Reform 
Efforts to amend the Japanese Constitution have focused on 
some of the more ambiguous parts of the text. These include the 
Constitution’s anomalous and rather vague description of the 
Emperor,125 the absence of environmental protection or special 
 
 121 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl. (Japan). 
 122 This is a controversial position, of course, discussed at great length by 
scholars. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21. 
 123 As a good overview of arguments in favor of amending the 
Constitution, see generally WATANABE OSAMU, NIHONKOKU KENPŌ KAISEI SHI 
[A HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 231–33 
(1987). 
 124 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] art. 96 (Japan). 
 125 Id. at art. 1–8. 
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protections for persons with disabilities,126 limitations on the funding 
of religion127 and, of course, Article 9. While many of these changes 
are controversial, changes to Article 9 may be the most controversial 
of all.128 
It is easy to see why many successive governments have 
desired to amend Article 9. First, as discussed above, the language is 
vague and open to many interpretations. Second, the way the 
language interacts with the Treaty of San Francisco creates significant 
unresolved legal questions. An Amendment could clarify matters and 
add legitimacy through a public referendum.129 
Politically, however, revision of the Constitution has proven 
unpopular. Even Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, widely 
considered the strongest post-War Prime Minister until the present 
Abe administration,130 downplayed constitutional revision between 
1982 and 1987, fearing a lack of public support.131 Indeed, despite 
decades of attempts, the Constitution has never been amended.132 
Nevertheless, the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has 
adopted several party platforms calling for revision of the 
constitution. The most serious recent efforts came in 2005 and 2012, 
when the LDP released two draft amendments. 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 The Japanese Constitution, in effect, already incorporates amendment 
language proposed (and rejected) by Senator James Blaine in the 19th century. See 
Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench) 31 Minshū 4, 522, 
533 (1977). 
 128 Poll Shows 56% of Japanese Oppose Amending Constitution under Abe 
Government, KYODO NEWS WIRE (July 24, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2019/07/24/national/politics-diplomacy/56-japanese-oppose-amending-
constitution-abe-government-poll-shows/#.XiXEGRdKh0s (noting the specific 
public opposition to proposals to amend Article 9). 
 129 Interview with Eiichi Hasegawa, Special Adviser, Prime Minister of 
Japan, Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 11, 2019). 
 130 Robert Angel, Prime Ministerial Leadership in Japan: Recent Changes in 
Personal Style and Administrative Organization, 61 PACIFIC AFF. 583, 583 (1988). 
 131 GERALD CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS: LEADERS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 147 (1999). 
 132 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan). 
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2. 2005 Constitutional Reform Proposal 
Prime Minister Koizumi proposed the first of these draft 
amendments on November 22nd, 2005.133 The first part of this 
amendment was aimed at Article 9, clarifying the status of the 
JSDF.134 The 2005 amendment also created a separate and well-
defined system of military courts, clarifying the unresolved legal 
question of JSDF jurisdiction. Additional amendments focused on 
other areas of legal ambiguity, such as: (a) removing the strict bar on 
funding religious institutions (which, for example, bans public 
funding of military chaplains); (b) making technical modifications to 
the relationship between the central government and the prefectures, 
increasing federalism; and, (c) modifying the constitutional 
amendment process to make further amendments easier. 
The 2005 draft was controversial and fiercely debated. Nearly 
all of the American coverage of the debate focused on the political 
dynamics of the proposed amendment, with the LDP and PM 
Koizumi roundly castigated for attempting to reverse “Japan’s 
pacifist Constitution.”135 Little to no English-language writing 
pointed out that the Amendment was principally drafted to resolve 
unclear legal questions. Even English-language voices sympathetic to 
constitutional change focused on the geopolitical forces motivating 
the revision of Article 9, particularly rising Chinese ambitions.136 The 
legal aspect of the debate was almost entirely ignored. 
In the end, no formal amendment was proposed, because 
Prime Minister Koizumi retired after a then-unusually long nearly 
 
 133 See Canon Pence, Reform in the Rising Sun: Koizumi’s Bid to Revise Japan’s 
Pacifist Constitution, 32 N. C. J. INTL’L. & COM. REG. 335 (2006) (“On November 22, 
2005 the ruling coalition of Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), released a 
draft proposal to reform the Constitution.”). 
 134 Id. at 336 (“The most significant change proposed by the LDP, and 
arguably the chief purpose of the draft revision, is to remove the war renunciation 
language of Article 9 of the constitution.”). 
 135 See, e.g., Id. at 380 (“In a move that some say undermines the principle 
of pacifism and ignores the lessons of Japan’s past, the new draft . . . “). 
 136 In this context, the 2004 incursion into Japanese territorial water of a 
submerged Chinese submarine was particularly significant. See Mizuho Aoki, Chinese 
Submarine Intrusion Considered an Act of Provocation, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 13, 2004). 
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five-year term.137 Prime Minister Abe took over from 2006-2007, but 
was unable to form a stable enough coalition to push the amendment 
proposal.138 At the same time, the amendment package was 
underwater in the polls, in part because an influential panel of legal 
experts pointed out that several constitutional ambiguities (like the 
status of the Emperor) were actually not resolved by the 2005 
Proposal.139 In an effort to address these concerns, Abe proposed 
that the Parliament pass legislation allowing for a national 
referendum on constitutional revision, with the details to be 
hammered out later on in the process.140 Amid protests and low 
approval ratings, the Government ultimately decided not to move 
forward. 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and allied parties took 
control of the Japanese Parliament in a historic election in 2008.141 As 
constitutional reform had long been associated with the LDP, the 
DPJ did not push for it at all, though parts of the DPJ coalition 
actually favored many of the proposed reforms (for example, a 
constitutional amendment to prohibit disability discrimination).142 
 
 137 Reiji Yoshida & Kazuaki Nagata, Koizumi to exit political stage, JAPAN 
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2008), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/09/26/
national/koizumi-to-exit-political-stage/. 
 138 Japanese Prime Minister Resigns, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2007, 4:17 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6990519.stm (“ . . . but his poll ratings 
plummeted amid a row over pensions and a series of financial scandals involving 
some of his cabinet ministers”). 
 139 Japan approves constitution steps, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2007, 8:45 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6652809.stm (“Public opinion in Japan 
on the issue also appears to be mixed”).”) 
 140 Kyodo, Response to Abe’s Drive: Support Falls for Amending Constitution, 
JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 17, 2007), cited in JAPAN’S POLITICS AND ECONOMY: 
PERSPECTIVES ON CHANGE 65 (Marie Söderberg & Patricia A. Nelson eds., 2010). 
 141 ’Major Win’ for Japan Opposition, BBC NEWS (Aug, 30, 2009, 4:37 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8229368.stm (“The DPJ has won 300 
seats in the 480-seat lower house, ending 50 years of almost unbroken rule by the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) . . . DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama hailed the win as 
a revolution.”). 
 142 Interview with Takeuchi Norio, Member of Parliament, Constitutional 
Democratic Party, New York, N.Y. (Apr. 16, 2019). 
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The DPJ government collapsed in 2011-2012, in a landslide general 
election victory for the LDP and Prime Minister Abe.143 
3. 2012 Constitutional Reform Proposal 
As part of the parliamentary campaign in 2012, the LDP 
released a new proposal for constitutional reform.144 The new reform 
proposal contained several changes and represents the most recent 
plan to formally amend the Constitution. 
First, the proposal revised the Constitution’s preamble, 
modifying some of its theoretical and normative language. Similarly, 
the language regarding human rights is somewhat revised.145 Next, 
the new amendment formally defines the Emperor as the Head of 
State, as well as codifying Japan’s national flag and anthem.146 
Controversially, the new draft permits the Government to restrict 
public expression for the public interest or to support public order.147 
The new draft also proposes a new system of patents and intellectual 
property rights,148 makes it harder for public workers to unionize149 
and adds new rights, including protection of privacy,150 accountability 
of the State,151 environmental protections152 and the rights of victims 
of crimes.153 Discrimination against persons with disabilities is also 
prohibited.154 The draft deletes a clause prohibiting the establishment 
 
 143 See generally TOMOHITO SHINODA, CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE 
POLITICS: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND POWER SHIFTS (2013). 
 144 Id. 
 145 For example, instances of the phrase “public welfare” are replaced by 
the phrase “public interest.” Policy Platform of the LDP, supra note 20, at 19. 
 146 Id. at 22. 
 147 Id. at 19. 
 148 Id. at 11. 
 149 Id. at 10. 
 150 Id. at 3. 
 151 Id. at 3. 
 152 Id. at 28. 
 153 Id. at 3. 
 154 Policy Platform of the LDP, supra note 20, at 19. The amendment 
proposal would add this to the Constitution; Japan presently prohibits 
discrimination against persons with disability through legislation alone. See generally 
KATHARINA HEYER, RIGHTS ENABLED: THE DISABILITY REVOLUTION, FROM THE 
US, TO GERMANY AND JAPAN, TO THE UNITED NATIONS 123–66 (2015); see also 
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of religion,155 changes the way that Supreme Court judges are 
reviewed156 and makes it easier to pass further amendments to the 
Constitution in the future.157 
Many of these provisions were controversial in Japan and 
generated an enormous amount of public debate.158 However, the 
bulk of the English-language commentary focused on the proposal’s 
amendments to Article 9.159 The proposed draft amends Article 9 to 
state that a formal national defense force is authorized, with the 
Prime Minister as commander in chief.160 The proposed amendment 
still requires the self-defense forces to remain defensive.161 
Additionally, the amendment adds a procedure for the government to 
declare a national emergency, permitting expedited law-making 
during such crises.162 It is important to understand the context of 
these proposals. They go beyond the 2005 draft amendment, aiming 
to address a broader range of legal issues. Although the substance of 
these reforms is very much legal, little to none of the English-
language material discussed the legal dimensions of the constitutional 
amendment debate.163 
 
Adam P. Liff & Ko Maeda, Order from Chaos: Why Shinzo Abe Faces an Uphill Battle to 
Revise Japan’s Constitution, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2018/12/15/why-shinzo-abe-faces-an-uphill-battle-to-revise-japans-
constitution/ (discussing the public debate back and forth over various different 
constitutional amendment proposals). 
 155 Id. at 22. 
 156 Id. at 12. 
 157 Id. at 29. 
 158 Masami Ito, Constitution Again Faces Calls for Revision to Meet 
Reality, JAPAN TIMES, (May 1, 2012), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05
/01/reference/constitution-again-faces-calls-for-revision-to-meet-reality/ 
(discussing the divide between security experts who seek an amendment to the 
Constitution formalizing the legal structure of the JSDF and general public opinion 
against it). 
 159 Mizobuchi, supra note 12. 
 160 Policy Platform of the LDP, supra note 20, at 2. 
 161 Id. at 2. 
 162 Id. at 2. 
 163 Mizobuchi, supra note 12. 
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4. Current Status 
Despite decades of debate, most opinion polls continue to 
show that the majority of Japanese citizens oppose amending the 
Constitution or changing Article 9.164 Nevertheless, constitutional 
revision remains a priority for the LDP.165 As recently as the last 
Parliamentary election, Prime Minister Abe spoke at length on the 
importance of amending the Constitution, although with less 
specificity than his previous proposals.166 The continuing salience of 
the constitutional amendment issue is one of the major fault lines in 
Japanese politics, as evinced by the name of one of Japan’s strongest 
opposition parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP).167 
There are also major strategic implications—the United States 
 
 164 Craig Mark, Japan Debates Changing Its Pacifist Constitution, THE 
DIPLOMAT (May 18, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japan-debates-
changing-its-pacifist-constitution/ (“But the pacifist sentiments of a majority of the 
Japanese people could be the greatest obstacle to passing any referendum. A recent 
Kyodo News poll found 49 percent support for changing Article 9, with 47 percent 
against. But another NHK poll had only 25 percent for change, with 57 percent 
opposed.”). 
 165 Id. (“Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared ‘the time is ripe to begin a 
debate on possible change.’”). 
 166 Id. (“Abe said that since the war-renouncing clauses would be 
maintained, Japanese forces would not join wars abroad. He claimed many legal 
scholars consider the forces’ very existence unconstitutional – hence his motive for 
proposing constitutional change was merely to resolve this ambiguity, and therefore 
improve Japan’s overall security.”) 
 167 2017 Lower House Election / Edano Announces Launch of New Party of 
Liberals, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Oct. 2, 2017, 8:34 PM), the-japan-
news.com/news/article/0003978833 [https://web.archive.org/web/201710022157
42/http:/the-japan-news.com/news/article/0003978833]; see also Liff, supra n. 154 
(discussing the ambivalence of the LDP’s coalition partner and disputes between 
the parties over the Constitution). 
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generally supports an Amendment of Article 9,168 while China and 
North Korea both strongly oppose it.169 
Politics continues to play a central role in shaping the 
constitutional amendment debate. However, in our view, there is no 
denying that legal ambiguity plays a major role as well, particularly 
with regard to Article 9. While English-language writing often covers 
the political debate at great length, very little of it addresses the legal 
issues. We aim to take a step toward filling that gap in Part II. 
II. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE REINTERPRETATION 
We now direct our attention toward the legal arguments 
surrounding Article 9 and the 2014 Reinterpretation permitting 
collective self-defense. We begin by recounting the historical and 
political background of the 2014 Reinterpretation. We then discuss 
the political and scholarly response, with a focus on English-language 
commentary. Finally, we delve into the many legal intricacies 
surrounding Article 9. 
A. The Reinterpretation 
In the summer of 2014, the Cabinet of Japan announced that 
it was adopting an interpretation of Article 9 that permitted collective 
self-defense.170 Collective self-defense refers to the defense of allied 
units in military operations.171 For example, suppose that two 
Japanese and American destroyers were sailing in joint formation. If 
the Japanese ship came under attack, the American ship could come 
 
 168 Jeffrey P. Richter, Japan’s “Reinterpretation” of Article 9: A Pyrrhic Victory 
for American Foreign Policy? 101 IOWA L. REV. 1223 (2016) (“ . . . as it has for decades 
been pushing Japan to repeal Article 9 so that it could assist the United States and 
its allies during the Cold War”). 
 169 Id. (“Japan’s neighbors—particularly China—have responded to this 
[attempt to revise the Constitution to normalize the JSDF] . . . with widespread 
condemnation”). 
 170 Richter, supra note 168. 
 171 Id. (“For international lawyers the phrase ‘collective self-defense’ refers 
primarily to the well-established UN Charter right of States to defend other States. 
This right pertains to the jus ad bellum, that is, the law that governs when a State may 
use force against or in the territory of another State.”) 
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to its aid—collectively defending the group. The Japanese ship could, 
of course, also defend itself.172 Prior to the summer of 2014, 
however, if the American ship came under attack first, it was legally 
unclear whether the Japanese ship could come to the American ship’s 
aid. Such an action would constitute collective self-defense, which the 
law did not clearly permit.173 
After reactivating a panel of scholars and reviewing their 
report,174 the Cabinet adopted an official understanding that 
collective self-defense is lawful under Article 9.175 This process and 
decision is referred to as the “Reinterpretation of 2014,” the “2014 
Reinterpretation” or just the “Reinterpretation.” 
For decades, Japanese military planners operated as if 
collective self-defense was prohibited.176 But there was little practical 
need to act otherwise.177 Since the end of World War II, Japan’s 
principal security partner has been the United States,178 and, until very 
recently, American naval supremacy made it difficult to imagine that 
Japanese naval assets would be called on to assist American vessels.179 
The rise in the capacity and size of the Chinese armed forces 
has significantly changed this calculus.180 Since 2000, while American 
 
 172 See generally YOSHIKAZU WATANABE ET AL., THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
AND THE ROLE OF THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES 13-24 (Sasakawa Peace 
Found. USA 2017). 
 173 Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, Senior Adviser, Cabinet of 
Japan, Tokyo, Japan (Jul. 11, 2019). 
 174 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21. 
 175 Id. at 2. 
 176 Takei Tomohisa, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the New Maritime Era, 
34 HATOU 4, 5 (2008). 
 177 Interview with Kanehara Nobukatsu, Deputy Assistant, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary of Japan, in Tokyo, Japan (Dec. 14, 2015). 
 178 DOWER, supra note 37. 
 179 See David Lague & Benjamin Kang Lim, Special Report: China’s Vast Fleet 
is Tipping the Balance in the Pacific, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2019, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/ 
(“Globally, the U.S. Navy remains the dominant maritime force, the power that 
keeps the peace and maintains freedom of navigation on the high seas.”). 
 180 Id. (“In just over two decades, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the 
Chinese military, has mustered one of the mightiest navies in the world. This 
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military expenditures have risen only modestly,181 Chinese military 
expenditures have exploded.182 China has also continued aggressive 
island-building in the Spartly Islands,183 part of an area-denial tactical 
doctrine intended to neutralize American blue-water fleet 
superiority.184 These technological and policy developments have 
significantly increased the threat level for the American Seventh Fleet 
and other naval units.185 
Before these developments, Japan declined to engage in 
collective self-defense simply because it was not strategically 
necessary. The debate over collective self-defense is not about a 
settled matter of constitutional law, rather it is about a novel question 
arising from changing geo-strategic circumstances. As American 
strategists increasingly asked Japan to assist in collective self-defense, 
 
increased Chinese firepower at sea—complemented by a missile force that in some 
areas now outclasses America’s—has changed the game in the Pacific . . . In raw 
numbers, the PLA navy now has the world’s biggest fleet. It is also growing faster 
than any other major navy.”). 
 181 See United States Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget 
Request (Feb. 4, 2008), https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2009/FY2009_Budget_Request_Justification.pdf at 6 (reflecting a 
relatively constant expenditure in terms of GDP). 
 182 See Lague & Kang Lim, supra note 179 (“Under Xi, the Communist 
Party has also opened the funding tap. Between 2015 and 2021, total military 
outlays are projected to jump 55 percent from $167.9 billion to $260.8 billion. . . . 
Over the same period, the navy’s share of this budget is expected to increase 82 
percent, from $31.4 billion to $57.1 billion, the report said”). 
 183 See Kurt M. Campbell & Ely Ratner, The China Reckoning, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, (Mar./Apr. 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-
02-13/china-reckoning. 
 184 Id. (“For Beijing, the United States’ alliances and military presence in 
Asia posed unacceptable threats to China’s interests in Taiwan, on the Korean 
Peninsula, and in the East China and South China Seas . . . So China started to chip 
away at the U.S.-led security order in Asia, developing the capabilities to deny the 
U.S. military access to the region and driving wedges between Washington and its 
allies.”). 
 185 Kurt M. Campbell & Jake Sullivan, Competition Without Catastrophe, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Sept./Oct. 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe. 
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the issue of Japan’s legal capacity to do so became particularly 
salient.186 
After internal deliberations in 2012 and 2013, the Cabinet 
sought out external guidance on this complex legal question.187 In 
2014, the Prime Minister reactivated a special panel to advise the 
Cabinet on whether or not Article 9 permitted collective self-defense, 
drawing on the expertise of retired policymakers and legal scholars.188 
The panel released a report arguing that collective self-defense was 
lawful,189 and the Cabinet accepted that conclusion.190 
From the beginning, the Cabinet’s examination was intended 
to resolve serious legal questions affecting Japan’s security.191 There is 
a significant strategic cost to the ambiguity of the current legal status 
of the Self-Defense Forces.192 For example, in the summer of 2019, 
President Trump asked allied nations to assist the United States in a 
mission patrolling the Suez Canal.193 Given the sophistication of 
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces,194 and the alliance between 
Japan and the United States,195 it seemed natural for Japan to 
contribute.196 Indeed, Japan would very much have liked to do so.197 
 
 186 Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, supra note 75. 
 187 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21. 
 188 Id. at 54–55. 
 189 Id. at 32. 
 190 Linda Seig & Kiyoshi Takenaka, Japan Takes Historic Step from Post-War 
Pacifism, OKs Fighting for Allies, REUTERS (June 30, 2014), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defense/japan-takes-historic-step-from-post-
war-pacifism-oks-fighting-for-allies-idUSKBN0F52S120140701. 
 191 See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 1–4. 
 192 Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, supra note 75. 
 193 Id. 
 194 See Japanese Aircraft Carrier, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Aug. 3, 2012), 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ddh-x-aircraft-carrier.htm 
(“With the decline of Russian naval strength, the Self- Defense Forces’ fighting 
vessels and aircraft rank second in the world, behind the United States.”). 
 195 See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United 
States and Japan, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632; T.I.A.S. No. 4509. 
 196 Interview with Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi, supra note 75. 
 197 Japanese strategists viewed a dispatch of force as helpful to Japan’s 
strategic interest, since positively responding to American requests enhance security 
cooperation. Id. 
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But there were serious legal concern within the Abe 
Administration.198 Armed forces operating officially, in uniform and 
fighting under a declared flag, enjoy special legal protections under 
the laws of war.199 Of course, rouge nations might violate 
international law and disregard those protections.200 But, as Louis 
Henken once observed, nearly all nations follow nearly all of 
international law nearly all of the time.201 The protections extended to 
soldiers impacts their safety, and the safety of deployed personnel is 
(and ought to be) a significant concern for any state.202 
Suppose that Japan dispatched Maritime Self-Defense Forces 
to join the American multi-lateral force.203 And suppose that these 
forces were then captured and held as prisoners. Would they enjoy 
similar protections to American forces captured under similar 
circumstances? As the law stands, there is a good argument that they 
should; but there is also a real argument that they should not, that the 
Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional, and that soldiers claiming 
to so-affiliate are enemy combatants—or something else entirely.204 
This ambiguity weakens the deterrent and protective effect of 
international law, so well-established by Henken and others.205 It was 
also a significant factor in persuading the Cabinet that it ultimately 
 
 198 Id. 
 199 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL § XX (2016). 
 200 See Anna Holligan, Radovan Karadzic Sentence Increased to Life at UN 
Tribunal, BBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
47642327. 
 201 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979). 
 202 One of the main reasons, no doubt, that the Conventions have been so 
widely signed. See Jean S. Pictet. The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War 
Victims, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 462 (1951). 
 203 A proposal that was actually considered quite seriously. See Takenaka, 
supra note 11. 
 204 See Bruce Ackerman & Matsudaira Tokujin, A militarized Japan?, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2013-
jan-11-la-oe-ackerman-japan-constitution-20130111-story.html (Here, Professor 
Ackerman argues that the current defense forces are unconstitutional and Japanese 
overseas deployment is unlawful—he does not, of course, say Japanese combatants 
should be treated poorly.). 
 205 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 
YALE L.J. 2599, 2599–2603 (1997). 
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could not join the United States’ multi-lateral force.206 The legal 
ambiguity had a profound effect on important decisions of Japanese 
foreign policy, causing Japan to instead dispatch naval forces under 
her own authority, with more limited rules of engagement.207 
All of this goes to show that there is a real legal problem 
when it comes to the status of the Self-Defense Forces—one rooted 
in the documentary history of the Constitution. This legal ambiguity 
produces practical consequences for policy. And the Reinterpretation 
clarified some of this uncertainty.208 
B. Response to the Reinterpretation 
The conventional narrative in the English-language literature 
is that the Reinterpretation was solely, and shallowly, motivated by 
political pragmatism.209 Variations of this account dominate English-
language writing.210 That narrative goes something like this: Prime 
Minister Abe very much wishes to amend Article 9.211 He cannot, 
because the Japanese people oppose it.212 So, for political reasons, he 
 
 206 Taniguchi, supra note 173. 
 207 Takenaka, supra note 11 (“Japan, a U.S. ally that has maintained friendly 
ties with Iran, has opted to launch its own operation rather than join a U.S.-led 
mission to protect shipping in the region.”). 
 208 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21. 
 209 E.g., Craig Martin, The danger in Abe’s constitutional amendment proposal, 
JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/08/05/
commentary/japan-commentary/danger-abes-constitutional-amendment-proposal/ 
(“But this amendment proposal was politically impossible to move forward, and so 
Abe then attempted to achieve many of the same results through a 
‘reinterpretation’ of Article 9, through a Cabinet decision issued in 2014, followed 
by its implementation through the national security legislation enacted in 2015 . . . 
“). 
 210 See, e.g., Michael A. Panton, Japan’s Article 9: Rule of Law v. Flexible 
Interpretation, 24 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP L.J. 129 (2010). 
 211 This premise is true. See Japan’s Abe Hopes for Reform of Pacifist Charter by 
2020, REUTERS (May 3, 2017, 1:34 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
japan-government-constitution-idUSKBN17Z0BH. 
 212 Poll Shows 54% Oppose Revision of Japan’s Pacifist Constitution under Abe’s 
Watch, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/
04/11/national/politics-diplomacy/poll-shows-54-oppose-revision-japans-pacifist-
constitution/#.Xi-TaBdKhR0. 
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has forced through a de facto amendment (the Reinterpretation) to 
achieve some of his desired constitutional changes.213 
Approaching the Reinterpretation with an eye toward 
background social forces rather than object-level legal arguments has 
a certain appeal. It seems to provide a sense of what is really going 
on—a deeper insight into Japanese politics. There is, after all, no 
denying that political, policy and personal reasons played a large role 
in Prime Minister Abe’s decision to pursue constitutional 
amendment. From a foreign policy perspective, Japan’s principal 
security ally, the United States, has long urged Japan to adopt a more 
strident defense policy. In Japan’s case, that means normalizing her 
defense policy and armed forces,214 releasing American assets to 
spend more energy on deployment elsewhere.215 Arguably, a more 
conventional defense policy would also enhance Japan’s broader 
foreign policy influence.216 
In addition, the Reinterpretation is popular within the LDP, 
particularly within the more hardline conservative factions.217 Prime 
 
 213 The idea that broad democratic support is what makes Constitutional 
change legitimate is a hallmark of the “Constitutional Moments” model discussed 
at length in Part III, infra. 
 214 Seig & Takenaka, supra note 190 (“The United States, which defeated 
Japan in World War Two then became its close ally with a security cooperation 
treaty, welcomed the Japanese move and said it would make the U.S.-Japan alliance 
more effective. ‘This decision is an important step for Japan as it seeks to make a 
greater contribution to regional and global peace and security,’ Defense Secretary 
Chuck Hagel said in a statement.”). 
 215 Id. (“Washington has long urged Tokyo to become a more equal alliance 
partner and Japan’s move will also be welcomed by Southeast Asia nations that like 
Tokyo have territorial rows with an increasingly assertive China.”) 
 216 This belief is, at any rate, widely—and probably correctly—attributed to 
many members of the LDP. Id. (“Conservatives say the constitution’s war-
renouncing Article 9 has limited Japan’s ability to defend itself and that a changing 
regional power balance, including a rising China, means policies must be more 
flexible.”). 
 217 Id. (“[Q]uoting Gerry Curtiss—’Conservative governments have pushed 
the envelope hard and often to get the public to agree to a more elastic 
interpretation of article 9 . . . ‘”) 
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Minister Abe led a center-right faction within his Party.218 To remain 
in power he needed to be mindful of the further-right factions.219 
Prime Minister Abe could build political support with these factions 
through the Reinterpretation,220 so there were domestic political 
reasons to pursue it, even if the Reinterpretation is not broadly 
popular outside the Party. But, as many observers have noted, polling 
and other public policy information shows that while the LDP may 
strongly favor constitutional reform, the public largely does not.221 
Instead, the public is either unsure, or outright opposed, depending 
on the poll.222 Article 9 seems to be beloved by the Japanese public,223 
and attempts to revise it are viewed with great skepticism.224 
Because there is limited English-language writing on Japanese 
internal politics, and because the Reinterpretation is a highly 
controversial and sensitive topic within Japan,225 it is easy for this 
conventional narrative to take hold. It is also abundantly clear, from 
 
 218 List of Members, Seiwa POLITICAL-ANALYSIS COUNCIL [SEIWA SEISAKU 
KENKYŪKAI], http://www.seiwaken.jp/seiwaken/seiwaken.html#03 (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2020). 
 219 See generally Curtis, supra note 131. 
 220 Seig & Takenaka, supra note 190. 
 221 Id. (“Some voters worry about entanglement in foreign wars and others 
are angry at what they see as a gutting of Article 9 by ignoring formal amendment 
procedures.”). 
 222 See, e.g., Poll Shows 54% Oppose Revision of Japan’s Pacifist Constitution under 
Abe’s Watch, JAPAN TIMES, supra note 212. 
 223 This fact is conceded even by those who seek to remove Article 9. See, 
e.g., Akira Murao, Ishiba Attacks Abe for Shifting Stance on Constitutional Revision, 
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Sep. 7, 2018), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180907
/p2a/00m/0na/016000c016000c016000c7 (“At a meeting of Abe’s intraparty 
faction in early August, a member argued that removing Article 9’s second 
paragraph ‘may be logically consistent, but has little likelihood of getting support 
from the opposition or the public, and this should be understood by a wider 
audience inside the party.’”). 
 224 Id. (“[Removing Article 9] has little likelihood of getting support from 
the opposition or the public. . . .”) 
 225 Martin, supra note 209 (“Most readers will recall that this 
reinterpretation effort was highly controversial. The vast majority of constitutional 
scholars in Japan, along with several former Supreme Court justices and former 
directors of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, publicly claimed that the 
reinterpretation was illegitimate and unconstitutional, and tens of thousands of 
people protested against it on in the streets.”). 
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either a living constitution perspective, or from the perspective of 
original public meaning, that this kind of political workaround is 
improper.226 It denies the people their fundamental right to amend 
their government’s fundamental rules. The Constitution binds the 
government.227 The government should not be able to change it 
without asking the people.228 
This conventional narrative misunderstands the importance 
of the substantive legal questions at the center of the 
Reinterpretation. Because the Reinterpretation is fundamentally an 
effort to answer a genuine legal question,229 it deserves to be analyzed 
for its object-level legal merit. It addresses real, unsolved questions of 
constitutional interpretation. If the Reinterpretation answers these 
questions correctly—if it is right on the law—then it is as an exercise 
of constitutional fidelity, regardless of whatever other political factors 
might motivate the interpreters. 
C. Legal Analysis 
The problem with this narrative is not just that it places too 
small an emphasis on the legal dialogue; it is that it misunderstands its 
relevance. The law is not politics.230 It may be shaped by political 
forces, but it does not reduce to those forces. If the Reinterpretation 
advances a view of the Constitution that is legally correct, then it 
 
 226 See generally Ackerman, supra note 28; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40 (1997) (“It certainly cannot 
be said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the contrary, its whole 
purpose is to prevent change.”). 
 227 See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2013). 
 228 Indeed, the ability of the chief executive to act beyond the authority of 
the Constitution is a component factor in the ranking of the political freedom 
within a country by the widely cited Freedom House Index. See Freedom of the World 
2019, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/
freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
 229 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 1, 4–8. 
 230 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208–217 (1962) (distinguishing between 
political and legal questions). 
2021 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:2 
38 
does not really matter (at least not legally) whether that view is 
popular.231 
As mentioned briefly in Part I, there is a fundamental legal 
problem at the heart of Article 9 created by Japan’s treaty obligations 
under international law. Conspiratorial accounts miss this critical 
point and therefore misunderstand the fundamental disagreement at 
the heart of the Reinterpretation. The Constitution was ratified in 
1946232 and was, at that time, in a certain sense, the highest law of the 
land. Yet in 1946 Japan was still under occupation.233 Japan had 
surrendered unconditionally to the United States234 and the United 
States followed international law and norms in carrying out that 
occupation.235 Indeed, the occupation is now largely viewed rather 
positively in Japan.236 
Could the United States have ordered changes to Japan’s 
1946 Constitution? Or even vetoed it entirely? This is a difficult 
question. On the one hand, the Constitution is Japan’s highest law. 
On the other hand, an unconditional surrender is a surrender of 
sovereignty; the recognition that a state is no longer the sole master 
of its affairs.237 
1. A Belligerent Hypothetical 
Suppose that two states, A and B, go to war. To simplify the 
hypothetical, assume that they fight the war above-board—they 
 
 231 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very 
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, 
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”). 
 232 See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan). 
 233 See generally DOWER, supra note 37. 
 234 Id. 
 235 We need not arbitrate the legal dispute over whether compliance with 
international law is required for legal authority after an unconditional surrender. A 
fortiori, even if it is, the United States seems to have been operating within these 
constraints. See generally id. 
 236 Id. at 65. 
 237 Francis C. Balling, Unconditional Surrender and a Unilateral Declaration of 
Peace, 39 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 474 (1945). 
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declare in advance and they both commit no war crimes.238 
Eventually, B elects to conditionally surrender. A condition of the 
surrender is that B amend its Constitution to permit the payment of 
reparations to A for damages in the war equal to the harm B caused 
A, as determined by A or by a neutral third party. Suppose for the 
purposes of this example, that B’s original constitution explicitly 
made reparations payments of this kind illegal. The Instrument of 
Surrender and Treaty of Peace name A as the legal occupying power 
of B until such changes are made. 
Subsequent to the signature of this Instrument of Surrender, 
B amends its Constitution to permit the payment of reparations as 
determined solely by B to be reasonable and sufficient. A rejects this 
amendment and orders B to draw up a new constitution, Draft 3. B 
refuses to do so. 
Who is in the right here legally? We have no idea.239 A strong 
argument can be made for a kind of transnational law 
contractarianism, in which B has a duty to effect the changes in the 
Instrument of Surrender and, if B breaches that duty, A can demand 
specific performance.240 After all, since the decision by B seems 
fundamentally inequitable, specific performance seems reasonable.241 
On the other hand, it seems like B has a fundamental right to set its 
basic law. And if that law is the Constitution, it seems wrong to place 
another law above it. As Professor James Stern declared “we have no 
concept of what it would mean for the Constitution to be 
 
 238 These conditions are added to avoid complexity caused by the War 
itself being unlawfully launched or conducted. For simplicity, the author assumes 
neither country is a signatory to the UN Charter or any other document that flatly 
forbids the use of offensive war. We want a good clean hypo. 
 239 Even just by analogy to the United States, the answer is complex. Surely 
in the American context the Constitution is the highest law and should presumably 
trump any international obligations. Yet some international obligations may be so 
central that, some argue, they must always bind, nevertheless. See generally Richard 
Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 53 (1990). 
 240 A strong presentation of this argument is found in Makoto Iokibe, 50 
Years of Japanese Diplomacy, 500 INT’L ISSUES 4 (2001) [Japanese language]. 
 241 For this general approach to contract remedy, see CHARLES FRIED, 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). 
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unconstitutional.”242 But is there a way for the Constitution to be 
unlawful? 
This is more than just an interesting theoretical question — 
these are precisely the factual circumstances of Japan’s JSDF. Indeed, 
the conflict between GHQs instructions and Article 9 is a complex 
legal issue that Japanese legal scholars have struggled to answer. Their 
debates have produced a range of views. 
2. Contours of the Legal Landscape 
One approach, which we call Absolute Constitutionalism, 
maintains that the Constitution of 1946 is simply Japan’s highest 
law.243 Under this approach, any state action in conflict with that law 
is unconstitutional.244 Therefore, Japan’s 1950 enabling legislation 
would have no legal force, despite GHQ’s orders. On this account, 
the modern JSDF is either unconstitutional (because it is prohibited 
by Article 9), or permitted (because Article 9, properly interpreted, 
allows it). And if the JSDF is unconstitutional, then it always has 
been ever since it was created.245 
Another approach, which we call Limited Constitutionalism, 
holds that the order by GHQ did override the Constitution of 1946—
 
 242 Interview with James Stern, Professor of Law, William and Mary Law 
School, in Annapolis, MD (Aug. 10, 2019). 
 243 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 98, para. 1 
(Japan) (“This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, 
ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to 
the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity”). 
 244 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (noting that “Article VI of the 
Constituion makes the Constitution the ‘supreme Law of the Land”). See also 
Norikazu Kawagishi, The Birth of Judicial Review in Japan, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 308 
(2007). 
 245 Rui Abiru, Almost All Japanese Look Favorably at the JSDF, So Why Do We 
Keep the Forces in Limbo?, JAPAN FORWARD (Mar. 13, 2018), https://japan-
forward.com/almost-all-japanese-look-favorably-at-the-jsdf-so-why-do-we-keep-
the-forces-in-limbo/ (“[D]espite the government having always interpreted the 
JSDF as constitutional, it would politically be irresponsible not to try to counter the 
view of more than 60% of constitutional scholars that the JSDF is unconstitutional. 
The Communist[sic] Party, too, according to chairman Kazuo Shii, is of the view 
that, ‘the JSDF is incompatible with the Article 9 of the Constitution.’”). 
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but only until Japan regained full sovereignty. Once that occurred in 
1952, the Constitution again became the highest law. The trouble 
with this approach is that the Treaty of San Francisco, which restored 
full sovereignty to Japan, contained explicit language requiring Japan 
to recognize the lawfulness of commitments made during the 
occupation.246 If these commitments were the condition on which 
Japan regained full sovereignty, Limited Constitutionalism must hold 
that they were vacuous (or, rather implausibly, that Japan has never 
regained full sovereignty). Regardless, on this account, as in Absolute 
Constitutionalism, the constitutionality of the present-day JSDF 
depends entirely on the interpretation of Article 9. 
A third approach, which we call Sovereign Contractarianism, 
maintains that the orders of GHQ and the 1950 enabling legislation 
were completely legally binding at the time and, per the Treaty of San 
Francisco of 1952, remain completely legally binding. On this view, 
the JSDF is lawful and legitimate because, while it may or may not 
violate Article 9, the Japanese Constitution is not the highest relevant 
legal authority—treaty agreements enacted at the conclusion of the 
unconditional surrender are supreme and trump the 1946 
Constitution. 
A fourth and final approach, which we call Legal 
Internationalism, simply holds that all international legal treaties of 
Japan trump the 1946 Constitution. The idea here is that if Japan 
enters into a legally binding international agreement that conflicts 
with a provision of the Constitution, so much the worse for the 
Constitution. On this account, the JSDF is perfectly legitimate 
because it is required by the Treaty of San Francisco. International 
law is simply higher than national law.247 
 
 246 Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16, at art. 19(d) (“Japan 
recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of 
occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or 
authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied 
nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.”). 
 247 To prove our thesis in this paper—that the Reinterpretation debate 
turns on genuine legal issues—we do not need to arbitrate between these four 
views or prove that any one of them is true. All we must show is that these four 
views are actually held, actually plausible, and that the 2014 Reinterpretation is 
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Defenders of the purely pragmatic narrative outlined in 
Section 2 seem to implicitly assume that only Absolute 
Constitutionalism or Limited Constitutionalism is plausible. In other 
words, they assume that perhaps Japan was obligated to follow 
GHQ’s enabling instructions in 1952—but it certainly is not now. 
Coupled with the dubious assumption that there really is no legal 
dispute about the meaning of Article 9, it follows that there is 
nothing (legally) to fight about. 
However, careful legal analysis does not unambiguously 
support these assumptions. Japanese scholars and legal policymakers 
take seriously the continuing authority of the Treaty of San 
Francisco.248 In that treaty, Japan made a number of legally binding 
promises, among them that Japan would continue to be bound by 
lawful orders issued by the occupying powers. 249 In other words, by 
signing the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan explicitly affirmed the 
authority of many prior policies—including lawful commands by the 
allied Supreme Commander, General MacArthur. Japan therefore 
affirmed General MacArthur’s order creating the Self-Defense Forces 
through its Treaty commitments. This was not an idle promise; it was 
a fundamental condition of regaining sovereignty. z 
3. Further Contours 
The Cabinet convened its reinterpretation panel principally 
because it was unsure of the legal status of Japan’s present security 
situation.250 The panel heard testimony from legal experts, seeking to 
answer two questions: (i) had Article 9 of the Constitution been 
interpreted previously to forbid collective self-defense; and (ii) was 
 
about determining which one of them is accurate. This is sufficient to show that a 
genuine legal dispute exists. 
 248 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 4–8. 
 249 Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 16 at art. 19(d) (“Japan 
recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of 
occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or 
authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied 
nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.”). 
 250 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 3. 
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collective self-defense a form of self-defense under international 
law?251 
The panel first answered question (i), concluding that Article 
9 had not been interpreted to forbid collective self-defense. Although 
there is little legal precedent, the panel did carefully consider 
Sakata,252 determining that it did not forbid collective self-defense.253 
Next, the panel answered question (ii), concluding that 
international law views collective self-defense as a form of self-
defense.254 The panel drew heavily on the U.N. Charter, which 
explicitly reserves collective self-defense as a sovereign right (while at 
the same time forbidding other forms of military action).255 
Based on this analysis, Article 9 can be interpreted in three 
ways: 
(1) Restricting only aggressive forms of military 
action; permitting self-defense and collective self-
defense.256 
(2) Limiting Japan solely to pure self-defense; no 
collective self-defense.257 
(3) Forbidding any military forces of any kind, 
including the JSDF.258 
 
 251 Id. at 2. 
 252 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959). 
 253 Id.; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 5. 
 254 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21, at 32. 
 255 U. N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations”); U. N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
 256 This is the position taken by the Reinterpretation. See REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21. 
 257 This is one of the more common positions taken by opponents of the 
Reinterpretation, including the CDP, Japan’s largest opposition bloc in Parliament. 
See Norio, supra note 142. 
2021 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:2 
44 
Each of these views can be combined with the four views 
outlined above: (a) Absolute Constitutionalism, (b) Limited 
Constitutionalism, (c) Sovereign Contractarianism, (d) Legal 
Internationalism. 
There are, in other words, twelve possible legal views here. 
According to one set of views—1(a), 1(b)—the Constitution is 
supreme, but permits collective self-defense. Accordingly, the JSDF 
can engage in collective self-defense as long as Parliament wishes. But 
there is no obligation—nor even any obligation to maintain the 
JSDF. 
According to the largest second set of six views—1(c), 1(d), 
2(c), 2(d), 3(c), 3(d)—Japan must maintain a reserve force of at least 
75,000 persons pursuant to G.O. 260, incorporated into the Treaty of 
San Francisco. Therefore, both the JSDF and collective self-defense 
are lawful and legitimate. The constitutional questions are not 
relevant, because treaty law trumps. 
Although these eight views differ, all conclude that the JSDF 
and collective self-defense are both lawful and legitimate. 
Following a third set of views—2(a), 2(b)—the JSDF is 
lawful and legitimate but collective self-defense is forbidden by the 
Constitution. 
Finally, a fourth set of views—3(a), 3(b)—concludes that the 
JSDF is flatly unconstitutional and (presumably) should legally be 
disbanded. On this account, Sakata was wrongly decided. The 
Constitution forbids any armed forces whatsoever, and, obviously, 
forbids collective self-defense as well. 
The conventional English-language narrative seems to 
assume that only the third and fourth sets of views are legally 
plausible. But these views represent just a third of the real estate in 
the constitutional landscape. The assumption that only these views 
 
 258 Presumably, advocates of this position argue that Sakata was wrongly 
decided. See, e.g., Panton, supra note 210. 
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are plausible seems dubious, and little is advanced in the English-
language literature to defend it.259 
Many of these views, require a careful scholarly analysis of 
applicable treaties. Accordingly, reinterpretation by an expert panel is 
perfectly sensible—and since an advisory opinion is not possible 
under Japanese law, probably the best way that the Prime Minister 
can try to be faithful to the law. 260 
This analysis does not all justify the most radical of English-
language commentators, who assert not only that the Panel’s position 
is incorrect, but that the Prime Minister and his advisors know that it 
is incorrect and are pretending otherwise as part of a plot to deceive 
the electorate.261 This conclusion is simply not supported by the facts 
in evidence. 
4. A Noncommittal Defense of the Reinterpretation 
To emphasize the legal plausibility of the Cabinet’s position, 
we here present a sketch of an argument in favor of collective self-
defense. Our goal here is not to show that this argument is correct, 
but rather merely that it is a plausible good-faith legal stance. An 
argument to this effect might proceed as follows: 
The Supreme Court, in its most significant decision on the 
matter, determined that Article 9 does not forbid the maintenance of 
some security forces and in any event was not intended to completely 
foreswear self-defense.262 As it is emphatically the duty of the 
 
 259 An exception is Martin, who does present arguments in defense of his 
interpretative stance, although we disagree with his conclusions. See Martin, supra 
note 27. 
 260 See generally Matsui Shigenori, supra note 46; see also Eric Rasmusen & J. 
Mark Ramseyer, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001). 
 261 See, e.g., Panton, supra note 210. 
 262 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959) (“Thus, 
[Article 9] renounces the so-called war and prohibits the maintenance of the so-
called war potential, but certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the right 
of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power.”). 
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Japanese Supreme Court to say what Japanese law is,263 this decision 
implies that the Self-Defense Forces are, simply put, legal. Of course, 
it is possible that the Court erred in its judgment, but even if the 
Prime Minister felt this way, is he not bound to the law as currently 
interpreted?264 
Plausibly Sakata’s approval of the JSDF could be understood 
as conditioned upon the idea that the JSDF have a purely defensive 
role.265 But what of collective self-defense? If Japanese forces commit 
to defending allies when they are engaged, does that broader 
commitment contradict Article 9? And if so, does that make the new 
role unconstitutional? 
Because no case challenging collective self-defense had yet 
arisen through the adversarial process, involving the judiciary would 
mean asking for an advisory opinion.266 Advisory opinions are not 
permitted under Japanese law.267 What then ought the Cabinet to do? 
To get a final answer the government has to take a position, 
presumably in consultation with its own legal counsel.268 Once the 
government has set a policy, it could then be challenged and that 
challenge can be arbitrated by the Supreme Court.269 The analogue to 
 
 263 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan); see 
also, e.g., Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm’n, 30 Minsh 223, 248-50 (Sup. Ct., 
G.B., Apr. 14, 1976); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 1976, 30 SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 223; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 264 Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm’n, 30 Minsh 223 (Sup. Ct., 
G.B., Apr. 14, 1976); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579 (1952). 
 265 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959). 
 266 Cf. Letter by John Jay, Chief Justice, United States, to George 
Washington, President, United States (Aug. 8, 1793) (available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s34.html). 
 267 See generally Masahito Tadano, The Role of the Judicial Branch in the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights in Japan, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW (Yukimo Nakanishi ed., 2017); see also Rasmusen, supra note 260. 
 268 Id; see also Matsui Shigenori, supra note 46. 
 269 Critics of this argument would likely respond that the Japanese 
Supreme Court is too passive to be entrusted with this role. See, e.g., David S. Law, 
Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1425 (2011). Even if 
2021 Reinterpreting the Reinterpretation 9:2 
47 
the American system would be to ask White House Counsel or the 
Justice Department to submit an internal memorandum opining on 
the correct interpretation of a constitutional restriction.270 Nor are 
there separation of powers concerns: if the Prime Minister comes to 
an incorrect conclusion there is both a judicial remedy (the courts can 
strike down the interpretation) and a political one (through the 
election of a new Prime Minister). 
Of course, this is precisely what the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet have done through the Reinterpretation. The Cabinet took a 
complex question and submitted it for expert analysis.271 The Cabinet 
then adopted a working position they take to represent those expert’s 
conclusions. If they have erred, the Supreme Court stands ready to 
clarify. The Reinterpretation is not an attempt to go around the 
Constitution — it is an attempt to work within it. 
D. Conclusion 
The 2014 Reinterpretation is often portrayed as an end-run 
around the restrictions of Article 9. But the evidence does not 
support this narrative. First, Article 9 has not been interpreted to 
restrict collective self-defense.272 Second, the Reinterpretation was 
throughout squarely focused on legal questions.273 
Japan adopted Article 9 under unusual circumstances that 
pose novel legal questions. Unique legal facts and history affected the 
creation of the Self-Defense Forces. Path-dependence and the 
specifics of past legal cases shaped a history of debates over 
interpretation. 
There are real legal questions at play here because the 
documents that form the basis of the law are genuinely unclear. The 
 
this criticism were sound, the error is the Supreme Courts. The Prime Minister 
must follow the Constitution—if the Court is too lackadaisical in its approach that 
does not change the PM’s lawful duties. 
 270 Tadano, supra note 267. 
 271 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21. 
 272 Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959). 
 273 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 21. 
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Reinterpretation is an attempt to answer these thorny questions. 
Similarly, a constitutional amendment would help further clarify the 
status of the armed forces and their treatment under international law 
by bringing the Constitution more clearly into harmony with 
international obligations. Like the Restatements, or clarifying rules 
promulgated by an agency after notice and comment, efforts to bring 
harmony to confusing and conflicting laws have real merit. Like any 
legal project, these efforts may fail. But that doesn’t make it a 
conspiracy—just a work in progress. 
III. IS THE REINTERPRETATION CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE? 
The debate over the Reinterpretation reflects a common 
trope in constitutional discourse: the other side is accused of not 
merely misunderstanding the Constitution, but ignoring its meaning 
entirely.274 Rather, the other side is engaged, not in an act of 
constitutional interpretation, but of “constitutional revision.”275 This 
line of attack views the opposing position as either so obviously 
unsupported by the Constitution, or so openly based on extra-
constitutional considerations, that it does not qualify even as an 
attempt to faithfully interpret the meaning of the text. Instead, it is a 
naked exercise of political power, brazenly ignoring the constitutional 
constraints on that power.276 
As Part II of this Essay explains, this argument unreasonably 
sidelines the serious legal justifications for the current Constitutional 
Reinterpretation in Japan. The continuing authority of General 
 
 274 See, e.g., Letter from Donald J. Trump, President, United States, to 
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, United States House of Representatives (Dec. 17, 2019) 
(“By proceeding with your invalid impeachment, you are violating your oaths of 
office, you are breaking your allegiance to the Constitution, and you are declaring 
open war on American democracy.”). 
 275 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(accusing the majority of revising, rather than interpreting, the Constitution, by 
protecting the unenumerated right of same-sex couples to marry). 
 276 See e.g., id.; Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 
2652, 2678 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “ignor[ing]” 
the “text, structure, [and] history of the Constitution” in favor of “naked appeals to 
public policy”). 
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MacArthur’s order combined with the international treaty obligations 
codified by the Treaty of San Francisco and other documents, raise 
serious, real and open legal questions with regard to their supremacy 
over the Post-War Constitution. While modern political and foreign 
policy considerations surely motivated the Abe administration’s 
stance on the necessity of collective self-defense, the Reinterpretation 
is more than simply an attempt to address a political problem. It is 
necessitated by the decades-long tension between Japan’s domestic 
and international legal obligations, and between those obligations and 
the country’s historical practice. 
Because critics of the Reinterpretation take as a premise that 
it is legally unfounded, they instead tend to analyze it as an attempt at 
informal constitutional change. Several scholars, most notably 
Professor Bruce Ackerman at Yale Law School, have proposed 
mechanisms by which constitutions can be effectively amended 
without going through a formal amendment process.277 Indeed, 
Professor Ackerman understands constitutional change as occurring 
primarily through these informal mechanisms. Viewed through this 
lens, the Reinterpretation is often seen as an illegitimate form of 
constitutional change, lacking the necessary popular support to 
qualify as an informal amendment.278 
The problem with this view, however, comes in the first 
instance from its premise that the Reinterpretation is a form of 
constitutional change. Rather than amending the Constitution, the 
Reinterpretation contends that its current meaning supports an 
expansion of Japanese military doctrine to encompass collective self-
defense. Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change rejects the 
possibility that reinterpretation can restore the original understanding 
of a constitutional provision.279 But that is precisely what the 
Reinterpretation seeks to do. Accordingly, the interpretation should 
not be viewed as an attempt at an informal constitutional 
amendment. Instead, it should be assessed on its own merits as a 
legal interpretation of the constraints Article 9 actually imposes. 
 
 277 See Ackerman, supra note 28, at ch. 10. 
 278 See e.g., Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26. 
 279 See Ackerman, supra note 28, at 835 (discussing the “myth of 
rediscovery”). 
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A. The Reinterpretation as Informal Constitutional Amendment 
Non-Japanese scholars analyzing the Reinterpretation as a 
form of constitutional change are often sharply critical. Professor 
Craig Martin, for example, has argued that the Reinterpretation is a 
transparent end-run around the Japanese Constitution’s formal 
amendment process.280 And Professors Rosalind Dixon and Guy 
Baldwin have argued that a single-party system like Japan’s may lack 
the necessary kind of democratic competition necessary to legitimize 
informal constitutional amendments.281 These analyses often employ 
Professor Bruce Ackerman’s model of “constitutional 
moments”282—likely the leading model of constitutional change 
outside of the formal amendment process,283 and one that places 
heavy emphasis on democratic approval of constitutional change.284 
Accordingly, scholarly criticism of the Reinterpretation has often 
focused on its lack of democratic foundation.285 
 
 280 Martin, supra note 27, at 508–11. 
 281 Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 158–72. This view of the triumph of 
the LDP is controversial and, in our view, ignores the diversity of policy opinions 
expressed within Japan’s factions. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins & Michael F. 
Thies, As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in 
Japan’s LDP, 22 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 293 (1997). 
 282 Id. at 148–52. 
 283 See id. at 148 (“Perhaps the best-known theory of informal 
constitutional change in the United States . . . is Bruce Ackerman’s theory of 
‘constitutional moments.’”) But see also David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of 
Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (describing most 
constitutional change as occurring outside the amendment process); Mark Tushnet, 
Constitutional Change: Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1510 (2009) 
(describing “constitutional workarounds”—i.e., governmental actions designed to 
circumvent constitutional prohibitions by relying on alternate provisions of the 
constitution—as “a method of amendment the Constitution without altering its 
text, in the same family as judicial interpretation and ‘constitutional moments.’”). 
 284 See Daniel Taylor Young, How Do You Measure a Constitutional Moment? 
Using Algorithmic Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional 
Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990, 2001 (2013) (“Ackerman insists that the mechanism 
that legitimizes reformers’ claims to popular sovereignty is the expression of 
political will manifested in these elections.”). 
 285 See Dixon & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 169–71; Martin, supra note 23, at 
508 (“To begin with, I would suggest that the absence of any expression of popular 
will in favor of the change, is a factor that counts against its legitimacy.”). 
2021 Reinterpreting the Reinterpretation 9:2 
51 
Professor Ackerman himself, for example, has been a vocal 
critic of the Reinterpretation for its apparent disregard of the 
democratic process.286 In one article, Ackerman briefly asserts that 
the Abe administration’s interpretation of Article 9 is “illegal,” before 
quickly proceeding to exhaustively list the ways in which Prime 
Minister Abe failed (or did not try) to gather popular approval for the 
Reinterpretation.287 For example, Abe is accused of failing to gather 
the legislative support to initiate a referendum to amend Article 9; 
failing to enact a constitutional amendment that would have made a 
referendum easier to pass; failing to push military legislation through 
parliament; and failing to make his case to the public, a majority of 
whom continued to believe the Prime Minister’s initiative was 
unconstitutional.288 Ackerman argues that, instead of going through a 
democratic process, Prime Minister Abe achieved his policy goals 
through an administrative process, “pressur[ing]” the government 
into adopting an understanding of Article 9 that would permit a more 
expansive use of military force.289 
On their face, these criticisms would seem to have minimal 
legal relevance. If the Reinterpretation’s understanding of Article 9 
were correct, an end-run around the Constitution’s formal 
amendment process would be unnecessary. The Constitution would 
not need to be amended, because it would already say what the 
administration asserted that it said. Additionally, public support 
would be irrelevant, at least with respect to the meaning of the text, 
because regardless, the law would be on the administration’s side. 
Alternatively, if the Reinterpretation’s understanding of the 
Constitution were incorrect, the above measures would be 
insufficient to remedy the legal error. Neither public support, nor 
ordinary legislation, can overcome a clear constitutional command. A 
Constitution’s guarantees “may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no elections.”290 If the Constitution does 
 
 286 Bruce Ackerman & Tokujin Matsudaira, Cry ‘Havoc’ and Let Slip the 
Constitution of War, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 28, 2015, 8:00 AM). 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 
 290 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
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not mean what the Prime Minister thinks, the only way to ratify his 
interpretation is through amendment. 
But, for Professor Ackerman, these democratic 
considerations have legal significance as well.291 Ackerman has 
advanced an understanding of constitutional changes that depends 
relatively little on textual formality.292 Instead, constitutional change 
occurs through a series of “constitutional moments”—outpourings 
of popular support that disrupt traditional practice and establish a 
new set of constitutional norms.293 Under this model of 
constitutional change, the concern with the Reinterpretation has less 
to do with its alleged lack of formal legal justification. Instead, the 
problem is that it changes the country’s constitutional understanding 
without the necessary super-majoritarian support.294  
Professor Ackerman conceives of constitutional change as 
occurring through a series of “constitutional moments.”295 These 
moments generally involve multiple branches of government, as well 
as the people themselves.296 They need not, however, involve a 
formal constitutional amendment.297 Instead, substantive 
constitutional change occurs when effectively ratified by the general 
public, usually in an election where the relevant change is a 
particularly salient issue.298 From this perspective, constitutional 
norms do not live in the constitutional text, or even in the history or 
 
 291 See Bruce Ackerman, The Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1751 (2007) (suggesting that a rigorous understanding of 
formal constitutional change can give rise to an “official constitutional canon that is 
adequate for use by lawyers and judges.”). 
 292 See Young, supra note 284, at 1997–98. 
 293 Id. at 1998. 
 294 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 27, at 447. 
 295 Ackerman, supra note 291, a 1763. See also id. at 1757–92. 
 296 Id. at 1777–1785 (describing how national elections, the judiciary, 
Congress, and the President all participated in bringing about the constitutional 
changes that defined the civil rights era). 
 297 See id.; Young, supra note 284, at 1997–98. 
 298 Young, supra note 284, at 2004 (“Ackerman attributes enormous 
significance to the supposedly heightened salience of constitutional issues during 
the elections.”). 
2021 Reinterpreting the Reinterpretation 9:2 
53 
intent behind constitutional provisions.299 Instead, these norms arise 
from the evolving consensus of the general public as demonstrated 
by a series of ratifying events.300 Amendments therefore have little 
role to play in the understanding of the constitutional change itself.301 
They primarily exist to codify and formalize law that has already been 
put into practice.302 The actual change in the law occurs through 
extraconstitutional, and often political processes.303 
The ‘constitutional moments’ model of constitutional change 
arises from the observation that a constitution’s implementation can 
change dramatically, even without an amendment.304 Ackerman 
developed this model in the context of developments in American 
constitutional law that occurred without a formal amendment 
process.305 The Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause in the wake of the New Deal, for example, 
significantly increased the federal government’s power to enact 
economic legislation, even if that legislation touched primarily on 
intrastate activities.306 But the only amendment from that period 
relevant to federal regulatory power—the 21st Amendment—limited 
the federal government’s ability to regulate the sale and production of 
alcohol.307 Similarly, the reinterpretation of various constitutional 
provisions to prohibit state-sanctioned racial discrimination, and to 
allow Congress to prohibit private racial discrimination, occurred 
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through a series of Supreme Court decisions and legislative acts.308 
Constitutional amendments have little if anything to do with this 
change.309 
Nor, according to Ackerman, does the Constitution’s original 
meaning. Many originalist constitutional scholars have argued that the 
Supreme Court’s New Deal and desegregation decisions helped to 
align the Court’s doctrine with the original meaning of the 
Constitution.310 From this perspective, the Court’s decisions in these 
areas did not cause constitutional change—they simply reversed a 
departure from the Constitution’s original understanding. Ackerman, 
however, rejects this notion, which he calls the “myth of 
rediscovery.”311 According to Ackerman, the originalist narrative both 
overstates the similarity between the modern era and the founding 
era, and understates the transformational nature of modern 
constitutional change.312 Ackerman instead argues that modern 
constitutional change diverges from the founders’ vision both 
substantively and procedurally.313 Substantively, modern 
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constitutional doctrine reflects principles and results in applications 
that Ackerman believes the founders would not have envisioned. 
And procedurally, modern constitutional change takes place outside 
of the state-centric amendment process laid out in Article V of the 
U.S. Constitution. Instead, change occurs through the development 
of a national consensus, mediated through national institutions.314 
To provide scholars and judges with a test through which 
they can identify legitimate (but informal) constitutional change, 
Ackerman breaks the process into roughly five steps.315 First, in the 
signaling step, an institutional actor signals that constitutional change 
could soon occur. Second, in the proposing step, the actor lays out its 
specific plan for constitutional reform. Third, in the triggering step, the 
people express support for this plan, usually through an election in 
which constitutional issues are particularly salient. Fourth, in the 
ratifying step, the people confirm their commitment to the 
constitutional change. And finally, in the consolidating step, the 
previous understanding of the Constitution is sidelined, and any 
resistance to it fades away. If these steps have been followed, 
Ackerman argues that we should grant the resulting change at least as 
much legitimacy as we would a formal constitutional amendment.316 
B. The Reinterpretation is Not a Constitutional Moment 
If one thinks that, for informal constitutional change to have 
democratic legitimacy, it must occur within the context of a 
constitutional moment, then the Reinterpretation may appear to be a 
failed attempt to force a constitutional moment.317 Although the LDP 
may have attempted to signal and propose constitutional change, the 
argument goes, they never garnered the popular support necessary to 
properly legitimize it.318 We argue, however, that Ackerman’s model 
of constitutional moments is a poor fit by which to understand the 
Reinterpretation. Ackerman’s model seeks to explain changes in 
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constitutional understanding that deviate from the Constitution’s 
original meaning. But the Reinterpretation is an attempt to 
implement, not change, the meaning of Article 9. 
Professor Rosalind Dixon has argued that the 
Reinterpretation is an attempt at informal constitutional change, but 
an illegitimate one under Ackerman’s model of constitutional 
moments.319 Dixon explain thats, while “[s]uperficially, at least, there 
is . . . evidence to support the existence of a constitutional ‘moment’ 
in the context of the Article 9 reform,”320 Japan ultimately lacks 
“sufficient political competition for a true constitutional moment.”321 
Dixon acknowledges that Prime Minister Abe may have “signaled” 
his intention to adopt a policy of collective self-defense “as early as 
2006.”322 And the LDP released specific proposals for a planned 
constitutional amendment in 2012. Accordingly, the “signaling” and 
“proposing” components of a constitutional moment appear to be 
present. However, according to the authors, these proposals never 
resulted in a triggering election that demonstrated democratic 
support for the change.323 Abe’s proposed amendment was never 
approved by the legislature. And although military legislation 
ultimately was adopted, Dixon argues that the LDP was able to pass 
legislation over popular protest because the party has had effectively 
unchallenged rule since shortly after the adoption of the post-war 
Constitution.324 Ultimately, Dixon concludes that informal 
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constitutional amendment may not be possible in a single-party 
system, where the absence of real political competition deprives the 
voting population of an effective channel by which they can express 
their approval or disapproval for a proposed constitutional change.325 
Professor Craig Martin has argued even more forcefully that 
the Reinterpretation cannot be understood as any legitimate form of 
informal constitutional amendment.326 Rejecting the notion that the 
Reinterpretation proposes a legitimate or plausible reading of Article 
9,327 Martin criticizes the government for pressing forward with its 
proposal despite the paucity of popular support.328 Because Abe 
cannot gather the necessary political support for a constitutional 
amendment, Martin accuses the Abe administration of a “deliberate” 
and “duplicitous” attempt to circumvent the formal amendment 
process,329 and suggests that even a formal amendment of the 
Japanese Constitution would be unable to legitimately “dismember[]” 
the Constitution’s “fundamental constitutional commitment to 
pacificism.”330 
As discussed in Part II, such accusations of “duplicit[y]” are 
unnecessary and unfounded. Even if the Abe administration might 
have preferred a formal amendment to more persuasively pacify 
critics, this does not imply that a formal amendment is required. If 
the Prime Minister either believed that Article 9 could be read as 
consistent with an exercise of collective self-defense, or that, 
regardless, it is overridden by international law requirements to 
maintain an active military force, then the parliament’s adoption of 
military legislation, and the government’s adoption of a stance 
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consistent with the Reinterpretation, is precisely what an 
administration should do in order to operate according to the law. 
Indeed, Abe’s proposed legislation significantly pared back the 
reform he had hoped to accomplish through constitutional 
amendment. The 2012 Amendment—in contrast with the 
Reinterpretation—expressly constitutionalizes the Self-Defense 
Forces, giving them the legal status of a conventional national 
military. There are real policy differences between these proposals. 
For example, a preemptive strike against a military threat is flatly 
inconsistent with the 2014 Reinterpretation, but arguably would be 
permitted if the 2012 LDP Amendment were to have become law. 
The Prime Minister’s restraint in declining to push for these broader 
policy changes suggests that Prime Minister Abe does not intend the 
Reinterpretation to circumvent the amendment process, but is 
instead attempting to enact only policy already consistent with the 
Constitution. 
If the Supreme Court had invalidated the Reinterpretation 
and Abe persisted in his stance, then Martin’s accusations would have 
more force. But Martin concedes that the Supreme Court is unlikely 
to issue a substantive ruling on the issue, and that if it does, that 
ruling may be highly deferential to the government.331 This point 
undermines Martin’s accusation of illegitimacy, demonstrating that 
the Reinterpretation’s position is consistent with existing doctrine (if 
not the Constitution itself).332 Official judicial interpretations of 
Article 9 have been relatively rare, and have clarified relatively little. 
The government’s adoption of a specific interpretative stance is 
therefore not a contravention of any established legal principle.333 
Moreover, since the Supreme Court ought to have a controversy 
before it rules on a question, the Reinterpretation may be a necessary 
prerequisite to the creation of such a ruling in the first instance. 
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This absence of authoritative judicial precedent undermines 
one of the fundamental premises of these arguments: that the 
Reinterpretation is an attempt at constitutional change. In Ackerman’s 
examples of informal constitutional amendment, the enacted change 
always upends not only existing practice, but also a settled 
constitutional understanding. The Civil Rights Era did not just end 
the legislative practice of government-enforced segregation; it also 
overturned an existing constitutional principle of “separate but 
equal.”334 The New Deal did not just change a legislative policy of 
economic nonintervention; it also overturned existing constitutional 
doctrine holding that the federal government had limited power to 
engage in such broad economic reforms.335 Indeed, Ackerman 
stresses the pre-moment constitutional doctrine may have been 
justified at the time, but the constitutional moment required a 
reevaluation of the country’s constitutional understanding.336 
Constitutional moments therefore represent more than just the 
clarification of unresolved legal questions. They represent historical 
changes in constitutional law, justified by historical changes in 
national life. 
By contrast, Japanese institutional practice has never reflected 
a consensus around the lawfulness of collective self-defense. Japanese 
courts, for example, have never authoritatively held that Japanese 
forces may not engage in collective self-defense.337 And while many 
(although not all) Japanese scholars may interpret Article 9 
restrictively, this should not be conflated with settled law. Before the 
Reinterpretation, the question of collective self-defense was simply 
less strategically pressing. However, increasing military expenditure 
by China, and corresponding increases in American requests for 
Japanese military expenditure and activity, have placed unprecedented 
pressure on Article 9’s constraints.338 Rather than attempting to 
overturn an existing doctrine, the Reinterpretation is a response to a 
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novel political situation that existing doctrine has never had the 
opportunity to address. 
Attempts to characterize the Reinterpretation as informal 
constitutional change presume the primary issue in dispute: whether 
the Abe administration’s understanding of Japan’s obligations under 
Article 9, in light of the Treaty of San Francisco, is a reasonable and 
legitimate legal stance. 
C. The Reinterpretation as Constitutional Fidelity 
Supporters of the Reinterpretation do not see it as an attempt 
to informally amend the Japanese Constitution.339 Rather than 
revising the Constitution, the Reinterpretation sets out to solve a 
specific legal question: what, precisely, does Article 9 prohibit, and 
how do those prohibitions square with Japanese obligations under 
the Treaty of San Francisco?340 Professors Dixon and Martin assume 
that Article 9 is inconsistent with Abe’s preferred military policy, and 
therefore understand the Reinterpretation as an attempt to amend the 
Constitution. But this assumption sets aside the primary point of 
dispute. The Reinterpretation’s fundamental premise is that Article 9 
does not prohibit the administration’s military policy.341 
If this premise is correct—or even if one merely grants that 
the Abe administration is operating on the good faith belief that it 
is—then the Reinterpretation should not be understood as an 
attempt at constitutional change. From its own internal perspective, it 
is not trying to change the Constitution, but rather to more closely 
adhere to it. Because the Reinterpretation is not an attempt at 
constitutional revision, it does not need to derive its legitimacy from 
an overwhelming groundswell of popular support, as the 
constitutional moments model requires. Instead, if the legal 
justifications for the Reinterpretation are correct, it derives its 
legitimacy directly from Japan’s governing documents. 
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It thus makes little sense to evaluate the Reinterpretation 
under a constitutional framework that assumes that it is impossible to 
rediscover a constitution’s original meaning. Instead, we suggest 
analyzing the Reinterpretation from a documentarian perspective. 
1. Documentarianism 
Professor Akhil Amar has advanced a philosophy of 
constitutional interpretation, which he calls “documetarianism”,342 
that emphasizes the truest interpretation of the Constitution over 
subsequent doctrinal developments. Documentarianism recognizes 
that constitutional change sometimes produces results inconsistent or 
in tension with the actual meaning of the constitution; but it treats 
such change as illegitimate.343 From a documentarian perspective, the 
job of constitutional actors is not necessarily to align their behavior 
with public consensus (unless, of course, that consensus is expressed 
through a properly ratified amendment), but to elaborate and clarify 
the meaning of constitutional guarantees when a new situation arises 
in which that meaning might not be clear.344 If constitutional change 
occurs outside of the formal amendment process, it should occur 
only to make the implementation of constitutional norms more 
faithful to the document itself.345 
The Civil Rights Era in the United States provides an 
example that helps to illustrate the difference. Ackerman considers 
the Civil Rights Era an important constitutional moment.346 
According to Ackerman, the era “radically transform[ed] the 
Constitution as it was then understood.”347 But for Amar, no kind of 
“formal constitutional amendment or informal amendment-
equivalent” was necessary to bring about this transformation.348 From 
 
 342 Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document 
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000). 
 343 See id. at 78–84 (arguing that judicial doctrines conflicting with the 
actual meaning of the Constitution should generally be rejected, notwithstanding 
stare decisis). 
 344 Id. at 79–80. 
 345 Id. at 78–84. 
 346 See Ackerman, supra note 291, at 1762–785. 
 347 Id. at 1769 (emphasis added). 
 348 Amar, supra note 342, at 83. 
2021 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:2 
62 
a documentarian perspective, the Civil Rights Era did not represent a 
constitutional transformation so much as a constitutional 
“restoration,” finally implementing the guarantees of the 
Reconstruction Amendments that had been disregarded for nearly a 
century before.349 Documentarianism does not require an amendment 
to restore the Constitution’s original meaning; just a “confession or 
error” from those who have distorted it.350 
Documentarianism should not be conflated with originalism 
or “pure textualism.”351 Documentarianism points the constitutional 
interpreter’s attention to what the constitution actually says; but it 
does not require the interpreter to focus narrowly on only certain 
kinds of textual evidence.352 Constitutional meaning can be evaluated 
according to the text of the constitution as originally understood,353 
or according to the original intention behind the constitution,354 or 
according to the purpose behind the provision in light of its 
history,355 or any combination of the above considerations.356 
Whatever the interpretative focus, however, the aim should be to 
arrive at “the reading that best fits the entire document’s text, 
enactment history, and general structure.”357 
Despite its focus on a largely static text, documentarianism 
does not preclude a constitutional interpreter from considering 
longstanding traditions or constitutional understandings.358 
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Occasionally, a Constitution may permit the interpreter to take such 
factors into account. Additionally a Constitution can be interpreted in 
a manner designed to accommodate existing practices.359 A 
documentarian interpretive approach can acknowledge that 
constitutional text may be susceptible to multiple interpretations.360 
And when selecting between those interpretations, a documentarian 
approach may prefer the construction that best accommodates 
historical practice.361 Such a choice not only reduces potential conflict 
between different branches of government, but also respects each 
branch’s ability to independently interpret the constitution. 
2. Documentarian Analysis of the Reinterpretation 
Arguments in favor of the Reinterpretation consistently 
sound in documentarian terms. Consider some of the arguments 
discussed in Part II. First, the text of Article 9 accommodates an 
interpretation that is at least consistent with collective self-defense. 
Though Article 9 renounces the maintenance of “land, sea, and air 
forces,” this renunciation comes with a prefatory clause.362 And this 
clause (at least arguably) limits the Article’s scope only to the use of 
military forces to wage wars of aggression. But documentarianism 
considers more than just grammatical analysis.363 Structural 
arguments also bolster this reading—if Article 9 intended to 
completely eliminate the maintenance of any military forces, then 
Article 66’s requirement that government ministers be “civilians” 
 
 359 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (acknowledging 
the multiple potential interpretations of the recess appointments clause and 
choosing the interpretation most consistent with the historical practice of 
Presidents making appointments in recesses other than Congress’ primary summer 
recess). 
 360 See Amar, supra note 342, at 79 (“But even after judges have derived as 
much meaning as possible from the document, they will be faced with a broad 
outline leaving a vast number of details unspecified.”). 
 361 See Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, supra note 358, at 1752 (“In 
choosing between these two plausible readings . . . faithful interpreters should 
embrace the [one] which helps the written Constitution cohere with settled 
contemporary practice. . . .”). 
 362 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION] art. 9, para. 2 (Japan). 
 363 See Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, supra note 342, at 28 
(distinguishing documentarianism from “pure textualism”). 
2021 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:2 
64 
would be redundant. These kinds of textual and intertextual 
arguments are the bread and butter of documentarian 
interpretation.364 
Or consider arguments looking outside the Constitution’s 
four corners. Almost immediately after the post-war Constitution was 
implemented, Japan was ordered to create national reserve forces. 
And this order was issued by General MacArthur, the same person 
who first called for the creation of a new Constitution for Japan. 
Documentarian analysis often considers the way in which a provision 
was interpreted shortly after its enactment.365 And as early as the 
1950s, Japan had adopted an interpretation of Article 9 that was 
consistent with the maintenance of armed forces for self-defense, if 
not collective self-defense. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sakata 
confirms this interpretation. Sakata interpreted Article 9 to permit the 
use of force in self-defense. And the decision deferred to the 
government’s judgment about how to accomplish Japan’s defense 
goals. Documentarian analysis places less emphasis on precedent 
than other modes of constitutional interpretation.366 But 
documentarian arguments can nevertheless rely on precedent when 
that precedent represents a permissible interpretation of the 
Constitution.367 
Finally, consider the argument that Japan’s constitutional 
obligations are inferior to its international ones. At first glance, such 
an argument might seem anti-documentarian if anything, denigrating 
the authority of the Constitution it is supposed to interpret. But not 
every Constitution purports to be the “supreme Law of the Land.”368 
Indeed, Japan’s Constitution suggests just the opposite, affirming the 
supremacy of Japan’s obligations under international law. The third 
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clause of the preamble declares “that no nation is responsible to itself 
alone,” that “laws of political morality are universal; and that 
obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would 
sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship 
with other nations.”369 These affirmations justify the post-war 
Constitution in light of the history of its enactment—another 
essential tool of documentarian interpretation.370 Though the 
Constitution of Japan was ultimately ratified by both the Emperor 
and the Diet, it was drafted at the order of the United States after 
Japan’s unconditional surrender. A documentarian could therefore 
appreciate that the Constitution of Japan derives its authority not just 
from the people of Japan, but from Japan’s relationship with other 
nations as well. 
None of this is to say that this interpretation of Article 9 is 
correct. But it is an interpretation. The Reinterpretation draws on 
conventional tools of constitutional analysis, used to understand a 
legal text, not to amend it. The legal underpinnings of the 
Reinterpretation therefore do not depend upon an informal 
amendment process.371 Instead, the Reinterpretation contends that 
Article 9 either permits Japan to engage in collective self-defense, or 
that Article 9 is overridden by American instructions pursuant to the 
Treaty of San Francisco. If this premise is correct, then the 
documentarian argument is dispositive. The prevailing popular 
understanding of the Constitution cannot be made subservient to 
what Japan’s governing documents actually instruct. The adoption of 
an interpretation that the government believes more faithfully reflects 
the actual meaning of Article 9 should therefore not be characterized 
as “informal constitutional change,”372 but an attempt at 
constitutional “restoration.”373 
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CONCLUSION 
Since the adoption of Japan’s post-war Constitution, Japanese 
defense has operated in a legal gray zone: armed forces are arguably 
required by Japan’s treaty obligations but are arguably forbidden by 
Japan’s Constitution. Despite decades of subsequent legal debate, this 
conflict has never been fully resolved, and whether Japan may 
lawfully engage in collective self-defense remains an open question. 
The Reinterpretation contends that Article 9 poses no barrier 
to collective self-defense. This view is supported by serious legal 
arguments about the actual meaning of the Article, and the scope of 
its intended prohibitions. These arguments may be incorrect, and 
Japan’s Supreme Court may ultimately so order. Until then, the 
Reinterpretation should not be characterized as a rejection of law, but 
an attempt to harmonize it. If Article 9 is too strict, then Japan must 
either violate its obligations under the Treaty of San Francisco or 
violate a provision of its Constitution. Depending on how the Court 
rules, Japan may have to face that choice. For now, the 
Reinterpretation avoids the conflict, and it does so on the basis of a 
legal interpretation that seems, to us, manifestly reasonable. 
Because the Reinterpretation addresses a live legal question, it 
is not rightly viewed as an attempt at informal constitutional 
amendment. If its legal premises are correct, the Reinterpretation is 
not an amendment—it is simply the proper interpretation. Models of 
informal constitutional change may provide an alternative 
justification for the Reinterpretation—and if the legal foundation of 
the Reinterpretation is rejected by the courts, then those models are 
plausibly proper for determining the Reinterpretation’s legitimacy. 
For now, though, the Reinterpretation presents a legal question, 
resolvable by legal means. Until that question is resolved, it is no 
more legally necessary to assess the political reaction to the 
Reinterpretation than it is legally necessary to assess the political 
response to any other legal argument. 
Critics of the Reinterpretation need not worry that viewing 
the issue through a legal lens concedes it. Domestic opponents of the 
Reinterpretation have had no problem framing their argument in 
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documentarian terms. While we believe that there are serious 
arguments that Article 9 permits deference to the political branches 
when they act for Japan’s self-defense, and that the supremacy of 
international and treaty law in Japan remains an unsolved question, 
we readily acknowledge that this view is not the consensus. Some 
Japanese scholars have insisted that the Reinterpretation is 
unconstitutional, arguments we take to be serious and made in good 
faith. Our claim is simply that insufficient attention outside of Japan 
has been dedicated to the substance of this legal, documentarian 
debate—at least, relative to the focus on the Reinterpretation’s 
political implications. 
This may all be of limited political relevance to the ruling 
administration’s intentions. The current Japanese government is 
surely motivated less by academic legal arguments than by the grave 
and growing threats of Chinese and North Korean military activity. 
But political branches are supposed to be motivated by political 
considerations. While their actions must have legal justification, 
Japanese democracy provides a legal venue—the judiciary—through 
which these justifications can be definitively tested. 
A skeptic of the administration’s motives needs not give it the 
benefit of the doubt—just the benefit of the law. 
 
